Related papers: Extracting and Verifying Cryptographic Models from…

We present a novel and well automatable approach to formal verification of C programs with underspecified semantics, i.e., a language semantics that leaves open the order of certain evaluations. First, we reduce this problem to…

In recent times, many protocols have been proposed to provide security for various information and communication systems. Such protocols must be tested for their functional correctness before they are used in practice. Application of formal…

Security protocols often use randomization to achieve probabilistic non-determinism. This non-determinism, in turn, is used in obfuscating the dependence of observable values on secret data. Since the correctness of security protocols is…

Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive which performs encryption and signature in a single logical step. In conventional signcryption only receiver of the signcrypted text can verify the authenticity of the origin i.e. signature of the…

CHERI-C extends the C programming language by adding hardware capabilities, ensuring a certain degree of memory safety while remaining efficient. Capabilities can also be employed for higher-level security measures, such as software…

Use of formal techniques for verifying the security features of electronic commerce protocols would facilitate, the enhancement of reliability of such protocols, thereby increasing their usability. This paper projects the application of…

In the symbolic verification of cryptographic protocols, a central problem is deciding whether a protocol admits an execution which leaks a designated secret to the malicious intruder. Rusinowitch & Turuani (2003) show that, when…

Formal verification of cryptographic protocols typically relies on symbolic models that abstract away compiled code and microarchitectural side channels, leaving a gap between verified specifications and deployed executables. We present a…

This paper presents an evaluation of the code representation model Code2vec when trained on the task of detecting security vulnerabilities in C source code. We leverage the open-source library astminer to extract path-contexts from the…

In recent years, many researches have been done to establish symbolic models of stateful protocols. Two works among them, the SAPIC tool and StatVerif tool, provide a high-level specification language and an automated analysis. Their…

A model-theoretic approach can establish security theorems for cryptographic protocols. Formulas expressing authentication and non-disclosure properties of protocols have a special form. They are quantified implications for all xs . (phi…

In the absence of any efficient classical schemes for verifying a universal quantum computer, the importance of limiting the required quantum resources for this task has been highlighted recently. Currently, most of efficient quantum…

Static analysis is the analysis of a program without executing it, usually carried out by an automated tool. Symbolic execution is a popular static analysis technique used both in program verification and in bug detection software. It works…

Security protocols are building blocks in secure communications. They deploy some security mechanisms to provide certain security services. Security protocols are considered abstract when analyzed, but they can have extra vulnerabilities…

When large AI models are deployed as cloud-based services, clients have no guarantee that responses are correct or were produced by the intended model. Rerunning inference locally is infeasible for large models, and existing cryptographic…

Cryptographic Protocols (CP) are distributed algorithms intended for secure communication in an insecure environment. They are used, for example, in electronic payments, electronic voting procedures, systems of confidential data processing,…

We propose a comparative performance evaluation of security protocols. The novelty of our approach lies in the use of a polynomial mathematical model that captures the performance of classes of cryptographic algorithms instead of capturing…

We present a formal logic for quantitative reasoning about security properties of network protocols. The system allows us to derive concrete security bounds that can be used to choose key lengths and other security parameters. We provide…

Code that is highly optimized poses a problem for program-level verification: programmers can employ various clever tricks that are non-trivial to reason about. For cryptography on low-power devices, it is nonetheless crucial that…

Automatic security protocol analysis is currently feasible only for small protocols. Since larger protocols quite often are composed of many small protocols, compositional analysis is an attractive, but non-trivial approach. We have…