Related papers: Link Biased Strategies in Network Formation Games
We develop a constrained bimatrix game framework that can be used to model many practical problems in many disciplines, including jamming in packetized wireless networks. In contrast to the widely used zero-sum framework, in bimatrix games…
We study hedonic coalition formation games in which cooperation among the players is restricted by a graph structure: a subset of players can form a coalition if and only if they are connected in the given graph. We investigate the…
Motivated by applications in social networks, peer-to-peer and overlay networks, we define and study the Bounded Budget Connection (BBC) game - we have a collection of n players or nodes each of whom has a budget for purchasing links; each…
With increasing game size, a problem of computational complexity arises. This is especially true in real world problems such as in social systems, where there is a significant population of players involved in the game, and the complexity…
In this paper, we study a model of network formation in large populations. Each agent can choose the strength of interaction (i.e. connection) with other agents to find a Nash equilibrium. Different from the recently-developed theory of…
We consider a wireless channel shared by multiple transmitter-receiver pairs. Their transmissions interfere with each other. Each transmitter-receiver pair aims to maximize its long-term average transmission rate subject to an average power…
We propose a new class of game-theoretic models for network formation in which strategies are not directly related to edge choices, but instead correspond more generally to the exertion of social effort. The observed social network is thus…
(a) We propose a ``static'' construction procedure for random networks with given correlations of the degrees of the nearest-neighbor vertices. This is an equilibrium graph, maximally random under the constraint that its degree-degree…
Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various notions of…
The central result of classical game theory states that every finite normal form game has a Nash equilibrium, provided that players are allowed to use randomized (mixed) strategies. However, in practice, humans are known to be bad at…
In this paper, we consider the problem of network design on network games. We study the conditions on the adjacency matrix of the underlying network to design a game such that the Nash equilibrium coincides with the social optimum. We…
Motivated by the controller placement problems in software-defined networks and the fair division principles of classical "cake cutting", we investigate the following two-player zero-sum game. In our model, a defender places a limited…
Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…
One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to predict agents' behaviour. To better understand the spread of various products through a social network arXiv:1105.2434 introduced a threshold model, in which the nodes…
We study pure Nash equilibria in infinite-duration games on graphs, with partial visibility of actions but communication (based on a graph) among the players. We show that a simple communication mechanism consisting in reporting the…
We establish a network formation game for the Internet's Autonomous System (AS) interconnection topology. The game includes different types of players, accounting for the heterogeneity of ASs in the Internet. We incorporate reliability…
Graphon games are a class of games with a continuum of agents, introduced to approximate the strategic interactions in large network games. The first result of this study is an equilibrium existence theorem in graphon games, under the same…
This paper proposes a co-evolutionary model of directed graphs and three opinions, i.e., conservative$(+)$, neutral$(\odot)$ and liberal$(-)$. Agents update both opinions and social relationships with bias. We find that an emergent game…
This paper considers a networked aggregative game (NAG) where the players are distributed over a communication network. By only communicating with a subset of players, the goal of each player in the NAG is to minimize an individual cost…
Network games provide a natural machinery to compactly represent strategic interactions among agents whose payoffs exhibit sparsity in their dependence on the actions of others. Besides encoding interaction sparsity, however, real networks…