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Real social interactions occur on networks in which each individual is connected to some, but not all, of others. In social dilemma games with a fixed population size, heterogeneity in the number of contacts per player is known to promote…
The sampling of interaction partners depends on often implicit modelling assumptions, yet has marked effects on the dynamics in evolutionary games. One particularly important aspect is whether or not competitors also interact. Population…
How evolution favors cooperation is a fundamental issue in social and economic systems. In the business world, actively selecting a suitable project is usually helpful for a businessman to be in an advantageous position. By incorporating…
Stabilizing cooperation among self-interested individuals presents a fundamental challenge in evolutionary theory and social science. While classical models predict the dominance of defection in social dilemmas, empirical and theoretical…
Cooperation lies at the foundations of human societies, yet why people cooperate remains a conundrum. The issue, known as network reciprocity, of whether population structure can foster cooperative behavior in social dilemmas has been…
Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…
In this paper, we investigate the effect of "heterogeneity of link weight", heterogeneity of the frequency or amount of interactions among individuals, on the evolution of cooperation. Based on an analysis of the evolutionary prisoner's…
Cooperation is the cornerstone of human evolutionary success. Like no other species, we champion the sacrifice of personal benefits for the common good, and we work together to achieve what we are unable to achieve alone. Knowledge and…
Imitation is a basic updating mechanism for strategy evolution in structured populations, determining how individuals sample social information and translate it into behavioral changes. Higher-order networks, such as hypergraphs, generalize…
We study the self-assembly of a complex network of collaborations among self-interested agents. The agents can maintain different levels of cooperation with different partners. Further, they continuously, selectively, and independently…
We study an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with two layered graphs, where the lower layer is the physical infrastructure on which the interactions are taking place and the upper layer represents the connections for the strategy…
Human perception and behavior are affected by the situational context, in particular during social interactions. A recent study demonstrated that humans perceive visual stimuli differently depending on whether they do the task by themselves…
We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behaviour of the co-player, but on the similarity between the players. This system has been studied in a mean-field description recently [A. Traulsen and…
We consider the coupled dynamics of the adaption of network structure and the evolution of strategies played by individuals occupying the network vertices. We propose a computational model in which each agent plays a $n$-round Prisoner's…
Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for evolution of cooperation based on repeated interactions between the same individuals. But high levels of cooperation evolve only if the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds a certain threshold that…
Cooperation is beneficial for the species as a whole, but, at the level of an individual, defection pays off. Natural selection is then expected to favor defectors and eliminate cooperation. This prediction is in stark contrast with the…
Achieving effective and seamless human-robot collaboration requires two key outcomes: enhanced team performance and fostering a positive human perception of both the robot and the collaboration. This paper investigates the capability of the…
Recently, Riolo et al. [R. L. Riolo et al., Nature 414, 441 (2001)] showed by computer simulations that cooperation can arise without reciprocity when agents donate only to partners who are sufficiently similar to themselves. One striking…
When an individual's behavior has rational characteristics, this may lead to irrational collective actions for the group. A wide range of organisms from animals to humans often evolve the social attribute of cooperation to meet this…
The complete cooperation and the complete defection are two typical strategies considered in evolutionary games in many previous works. However, in real life, strategies of individuals are full of variety rather than only two complete ones.…