Related papers: Selfishness Level of Strategic Games
In recent work, semantic games of independence-friendly logic were studied in strategic form in terms of (mixed strategy) Nash equilibria. The class of strategic games of independence-friendly logic is contained in the class of win-loss,…
This paper introduces a novel method for estimating the self-interest level of Markov social dilemmas. We extend the concept of self-interest level from normal-form games to Markov games, providing a quantitative measure of the minimum…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
We propose a new dynamics for equilibrium selection of finite player discrete strategy games. The dynamics is motivated by optimal transportation, and models individual players' myopicity, greedy and uncertainty when making decisions. The…
The noncooperative Nash equilibrium solution of classical games corresponds to a rational expectations attitude on the part of the players. However, in many cases, games played by human players have outcomes very different from Nash…
Strong reciprocity is a fundamental human characteristic associated with our extraordinary sociality and cooperation. Laboratory experiments on social dilemma games and many field studies have quantified well-defined levels of cooperation…
We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent deterministic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel construction, called the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player concurrent game into a…
We study stable matching problems in networks where players are embedded in a social context, and may incorporate friendship relations or altruism into their decisions. Each player is a node in a social network and strives to form a good…
We study rational synthesis problems for concurrent games with omega-regular objectives. Our model of rationality considers only pure strategy Nash equilibria that satisfy either a social welfare or Pareto optimality condition with respect…
We investigate a time-inconsistent, non-Markovian finite-player game in continuous time, where each player's objective functional depends non-linearly on the expected value of the state process. As a result, the classical Bellman optimality…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
We consider the existence and computational complexity of coalitional stability concepts based on social networks. Our concepts represent a natural and rich combinatorial generalization of a recent approach termed partition equilibrium. We…
A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…
In \emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists of various demands on different resources. The player's utility is at most the sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a…
In this paper, we consider the problem of network design on network games. We study the conditions on the adjacency matrix of the underlying network to design a game such that the Nash equilibrium coincides with the social optimum. We…
In this short note we study a class of multi-player, turn-based games with deterministic state transitions and reachability / safety objectives (this class contains as special cases "classic" two-player reachability and safety games as well…
The price of anarchy, originally introduced to quantify the inefficiency of selfish behavior in routing games, is extended to mean field games. The price of anarchy is defined as the ratio of a worst case social cost computed for a mean…
Price of anarchy quantifies the degradation of social welfare in games due to the lack of a centralized authority that can enforce the optimal outcome. At its antipodes, mechanism design studies how to ameliorate these effects by…
I present a dynamic, voluntary contribution mechanism, public good game and derive its potential outcomes. In each period, players endogenously determine contribution productivity by engaging in costly investment. The level of contribution…
The mathematical characterization of social-distancing games in classical epidemic theory remains an important question, for their applications to both infectious-disease theory and memetic theory. We consider a special case of the dynamic…