Related papers: Default Swap Games Driven by Spectrally Negative L…

We consider an equity market subject to risk from both unhedgeable shocks and default. The novelty of our work is that to partially offset default risk, investors may dynamically trade in a credit default swap (CDS) market. Assuming…

In the theory of multi-agent systems, deception refers to the strategic manipulation of information to influence the behavior of other agents, ultimately altering the long-term dynamics of the entire system. Recently, this concept has been…

We derive the explicit price of the perpetual American put option cancelled at the last passage time of the underlying above some fixed level. We assume the asset process is governed by a geometric spectrally negative L\'evy process. We…

Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…

A multi-player competitive Dynkin stopping game is constructed. Each player can either exit the game for a fixed payoff, determined a priori, or stay and receive an adjusted payoff depending on the decision of other players. The single…

We consider the inverse problem of dynamic games, where cost function parameters are sought which explain observed behavior of interacting players. Maximum entropy inverse reinforcement learning is extended to the N-player case in order to…

We introduce the general arbitrage-free valuation framework for counterparty risk adjustments in presence of bilateral default risk, including default of the investor. We illustrate the symmetry in the valuation and show that the adjustment…

Static potential games are non-cooperative games which admit a fictitious function, also referred to as a potential function, such that the minimizers of this function constitute a subset (or a refinement) of the Nash equilibrium strategies…

We study a new kind of non-zero-sum stochastic differential game with mixed impulse/switching controls, motivated by strategic competition in commodity markets. A representative upstream firm produces a commodity that is used by a…

We study optimal behavior of energy producers under a CO_2 emission abatement program. We focus on a two-player discrete-time model where each producer is sequentially optimizing her emission and production schedules. The game-theoretic…

In this paper, we analyse some equity-linked contracts that are related to drawdown and drawup events based on assets governed by a geometric spectrally negative L\'evy process. Drawdown and drawup refer to the differences between the…

In this paper we study the nonzero-sum Dynkin game in continuous time which is a two player non-cooperative game on stopping times. We show that it has a Nash equilibrium point for general stochastic processes. As an application, we…

In this paper we develop structural first passage models (AT1P and SBTV) with time-varying volatility and characterized by high tractability, moving from the original work of Brigo and Tarenghi (2004, 2005) [19] [20] and Brigo and Morini…

Nonzero sum games typically have multiple Nash equilibriums (or no equilibrium), and unlike the zero sum case, they may have different values at different equilibriums. Instead of focusing on the existence of individual equilibriums, we…

We define and study a lending game to model the interbank money market, in which lending banks strategically allocate their cash to borrowing banks. The interest rate offered by each borrowing bank is within the interest rate corridor set…

We analyze a market impact game between $n$ risk averse agents who compete for liquidity in a market impact model with permanent price impact and additional slippage. Most market parameters, including volatility and drift, are allowed to…

We consider a class of infinite-time horizon optimal stopping problems for spectrally negative Levy processes. Focusing on strategies of threshold type, we write explicit expressions for the corresponding expected payoff via the scale…

While fictitious play is guaranteed to converge to Nash equilibrium in certain game classes, such as two-player zero-sum games, it is not guaranteed to converge in non-zero-sum and multiplayer games. We show that fictitious play in fact…

We study dynamic relationships in which one party extracts current surplus in ways that degrade the future state, while the counterparty cannot exit but adjusts effort in response. Standard stationary Markov equilibria may sustain collapse…

This paper studies a 2-players zero-sum Dynkin game arising from pricing an option on an asset whose rate of return is unknown to both players. Using filtering techniques we first reduce the problem to a zero-sum Dynkin game on a…