Related papers: Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design g…
In this work we introduce hierarchy in wireless networks that can be modeled by a decentralized multiple access channel and for which energy-efficiency is the main performance index. In these networks users are free to choose their power…
Network creation games are well-established for investigating the decentralized formation of communication networks, like the Internet or social networks. In these games, selfish agents that correspond to network nodes strategically create…
In a seminal paper, Chen, Roughgarden and Valiant studied cost sharing protocols for network design with the objective to implement a low-cost Steiner forest as a Nash equilibrium of an induced cost-sharing game. One of the most intriguing…
Recently Bramoulle and Kranton presented a model for the provision of public goods over a network and showed the existence of a class of Nash equilibria called specialized equilibria wherein some agents exert maximum effort while other…
How can a social planner adaptively incentivize selfish agents who are learning in a strategic environment to induce a socially optimal outcome in the long run? We propose a two-timescale learning dynamics to answer this question in both…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…
We introduce and analyze greedy equilibria (GE) for the well-known model of selfish network creation by Fabrikant et al.[PODC'03]. GE are interesting for two reasons: (1) they model outcomes found by agents which prefer smooth adaptations…
Congestion games are popular models often used to study the system-level inefficiencies caused by selfish agents, typically measured by the price of anarchy. One may expect that aligning the agents' preferences with the system-level…
Humans have developed considerable machinery used at scale to create policies and to distribute incentives, yet we are forever seeking ways in which to improve upon these, our institutions. Especially when funding is limited, it is…
We propose and study a model of strategic network design and exploration where the hider, subject to a budget constraint restricting the number of links, chooses a connected network and the location of an object. Meanwhile, the seeker, not…
In the context of networking, research has focused on non-cooperative games, where the selfish agents cannot reach a binding agreement on the way they would share the infrastructure. Many approaches have been proposed for mitigating the…
Designing well-connected graphs is a fundamental problem that frequently arises in various contexts across science and engineering. The weighted number of spanning trees, as a connectivity measure, emerges in numerous problems and plays a…
Cooperation is commonly found in ecological and social systems even when it apparently seems that individuals can benefit from selfish behavior. We investigate how cooperation emerges with the spatial prisoner's dilemma played in a class of…
How to form groups in a mobility system that offers shared rides, and how to split the costs within the travellers of a group, are non-trivial tasks, as two objectives conflict: 1) minimising the total costs of the system, and 2) making…
We consider a two-player zero-sum network routing game in which a router wants to maximize the amount of legitimate traffic that flows from a given source node to a destination node and an attacker wants to block as much legitimate traffic…
The threat of algorithmic collusion, and whether it merits regulatory intervention, remains debated, as existing evaluations of its emergence often rely on long learning horizons, assumptions about counterparty rationality in adopting…
Networks are beneficial to those being connected but can also be used as carriers of contagious hostile attacks. These attacks are often facilitated by exploiting corrupt network users. To protect against the attacks, users can resort to…
A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging…
Autonomous agents can adopt socially-aware behaviors to reduce social costs, mimicking the way animals interact in nature and humans in society. We present a new approach to model socially-aware decision-making that includes two key…
Automated design of multi-agent interactions with desirable equilibrium outcomes is inherently difficult due to the computational hardness, non-uniqueness, and instability of the resulting equilibria. In this work, we propose the use of…