Related papers: Path coalitional games
We study the approximate core for edge cover games, which are cooperative games stemming from edge cover problems. In these games, each player controls a vertex on a network $G = (V, E; w)$, and the cost of a coalition $S\subseteq V$ is…
We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. We restrict our attention to symmetric additively-separable hedonic games, which are a nontrivial subclass of…
Given a graph $G$, and terminal vertices $s$ and $t$, the TRACKING PATHS problem asks to compute a minimum number of vertices to be marked as trackers, such that the sequence of trackers encountered in each s-t path is unique. TRACKING…
Coalitional games are mathematical models suited to analyze scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. A fundamental problem for coalitional games is to single…
This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition…
Mobile edge computing seeks to provide resources to different delay-sensitive applications. This is a challenging problem as an edge cloud-service provider may not have sufficient resources to satisfy all resource requests. Furthermore,…
In many multiagent scenarios, agents distribute resources, such as time or energy, among several tasks. Having completed their tasks and generated profits, task payoffs must be divided among the agents in some reasonable manner. Cooperative…
We propose a novel decision making framework for forming potential collaboration among otherwise competing agents in subsurface systems. The agents can be, e.g., groundwater, CO$_2$, or hydrogen injectors and extractors with conflicting…
A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Every solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This general…
The arboricity of a graph is the minimum number of forests required to cover all its edges. In this paper, we examine arboricity from a game-theoretic perspective and investigate cost-sharing in the minimum forest cover problem. We…
A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the \emph{core}--the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games…
An important aspect in systems of multiple autonomous agents is the exploitation of synergies via coalition formation. In this paper, we solve various open problems concerning the computational complexity of stable partitions in additively…
In multiplayer games with sequential decision-making, self-interested players form dynamic coalitions to achieve most-preferred temporal goals beyond their individual capabilities. We introduce a novel procedure to synthesize strategies…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies over time according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a dynamic game, we allow the possibility for coalitions to deviate at any time and…
We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, where the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy augmented by a fixed non-negative bonus for picking a given…
We initiate the study of simple games from the point of view of combinatorial topology. The starting premise is that the losing coalitions of a simple game can be identified with a simplicial complex. Various topological constructions and…
In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are…
Cooperative games provide a framework for fair and stable profit allocation in multi-agent systems. \emph{Core}, \emph{least-core} and \emph{nucleolus} are such solution concepts that characterize stability of cooperation. In this paper, we…
The on-line shortest path problem is considered under various models of partial monitoring. Given a weighted directed acyclic graph whose edge weights can change in an arbitrary (adversarial) way, a decision maker has to choose in each…