Related papers: Heterogeneous Learning in Zero-Sum Stochastic Game…
Many real-world scenarios involve teams of agents that have to coordinate their actions to reach a shared goal. We focus on the setting in which a team of agents faces an opponent in a zero-sum, imperfect-information game. Team members can…
This work studies the problem of non-Bayesian learning over multi-agent network when there are some adversarial (faulty) agents in the network. At each time step, each non-faulty agent collects partial information about an unknown state of…
A key challenge in the study of multiagent cooperation is the need for individual agents not only to cooperate effectively, but to decide with whom to cooperate. This is particularly critical in situations when other agents have hidden,…
In large systems, it is important for agents to learn to act effectively, but sophisticated multi-agent learning algorithms generally do not scale. An alternative approach is to find restricted classes of games where simple, efficient…
This work develops a fully decentralized multi-agent algorithm for policy evaluation. The proposed scheme can be applied to two distinct scenarios. In the first scenario, a collection of agents have distinct datasets gathered following…
Learning in zero-sum games studies a situation where multiple agents competitively learn their strategy. In such multi-agent learning, we often see that the strategies cycle around their optimum, i.e., Nash equilibrium. When a game…
Meta-learning has been proposed as a promising machine learning topic in recent years, with important applications to image classification, robotics, computer games, and control systems. In this paper, we study the problem of using…
The goal of agents in multi-agent environments is to maximize total reward against the opposing agents that are encountered. Following a game-theoretic solution concept, such as Nash equilibrium, may obtain a strong performance in some…
We consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which one of the players has a private information on the game. Both players observe each other, so that the non-informed player can try to guess his missing information. Our…
In stochastic games with incomplete information, the uncertainty is evoked by the lack of knowledge about a player's own and the other players' types, i.e. the utility function and the policy space, and also the inherent stochasticity of…
This paper introduces a new approach for approximating the learning dynamics of multiple reinforcement learning (RL) agents interacting in a finite-state Markov game. The idea is to rescale the learning process by simultaneously reducing…
In this work, we propose, for the first time, a reinforcement learning framework specifically designed for zero-sum linear-quadratic stochastic differential games. This approach offers a generalized solution for scenarios in which accurate…
Differential equations in general and neural ODEs in particular are an essential technique in continuous-time system identification. While many deterministic learning algorithms have been designed based on numerical integration via the…
Adversarial environments require agents to navigate a key strategic trade-off: acquiring information enhances situational awareness, but may simultaneously expose them to threats. To investigate this tension, we formulate a…
Complex systems are often decomposed into modular subsystems for engineering tractability. Although various equation based white-box modeling techniques make use of such structure, learning based methods have yet to incorporate these ideas…
In the realm of evolutionary game theory, standard frameworks typically presuppose that every player possesses comprehensive knowledge and unrestricted access to the entire strategy space. However, real-world human society inherently…
In this paper, we extend the Descent framework, which enables learning and planning in the context of two-player games with perfect information, to the framework of stochastic games. We propose two ways of doing this, the first way…
We consider the general class of time-homogeneous stochastic dynamical systems, both discrete and continuous, and study the problem of learning a representation of the state that faithfully captures its dynamics. This is instrumental to…
Ordinary differential equations (ODEs) provide a powerful framework for modeling dynamic systems arising in a wide range of scientific domains. However, most existing ODE methods focus on a single system, and do not adequately address the…
When learning in strategic environments, a key question is whether agents can overcome uncertainty about their preferences to achieve outcomes they could have achieved absent any uncertainty. Can they do this solely through interactions…