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We investigate the effects of competition in a problem of resource extraction from a common source with diffusive dynamics. In the symmetric version with identical extraction rates we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium where the…
One key in real-life Nash equilibrium applications is to calibrate players' cost functions. To leverage the approximation ability of neural networks, we proposed a general framework for optimizing and learning Nash equilibrium using neural…
Statistical mechanics is based on interplay between energy minimization and entropy maximization. Here we formalize this interplay via axioms of cooperative game theory (Nash bargaining) and apply it out of equilibrium. These axioms capture…
We study the sensitivity of the expected utility maximization problem in a continuous semi-martingale market with respect to small changes in the market price of risk. Assuming that the preferences of a rational economic agent are modeled…
This paper derives polynomial-time approximation schemes for several NP-hard stochastic optimization problems from the algorithmic mechanism design and operations research literatures. The problems we consider involve a principal or seller…
Network slicing to enable resource sharing among multiple tenants --network operators and/or services-- is considered a key functionality for next generation mobile networks. This paper provides an analysis of a well-known model for…
For any $\varepsilon>0$, we give a simple, deterministic $(4+\varepsilon)$-approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare (NSW) problem under submodular valuations. We also consider the asymmetric variant of the problem, where the…
In a many-to-one matching market, we analyze the matching game induced by a stable rule when firms' choice function satisfy substitutability. We show that any stable rule implements the individually rational correspondence in Nash…
Electricity markets differ in their ability to meet power imbalances in short notice in a controlled fashion. Relatively flexible markets have the ability to ramp up (or down) power flows across interties without compromising their ability…
The maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) -- which maximizes the geometric mean of agents' utilities -- is a fundamental solution concept with remarkable fairness and efficiency guarantees. The computational aspects of NSW have been extensively…
We consider existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria in an $N$-player game of utility maximization under relative performance criteria of multiplicative form in complete semimartingale markets. For a large class of players' utility…
We consider repeated allocation of a shared resource via a non-monetary mechanism, wherein a single item must be allocated to one of multiple agents in each round. We assume that each agent has i.i.d. values for the item across rounds, and…
Game theory relies heavily on the availability of cardinal utility functions, but in fields such as matching markets, only ordinal preferences are typically elicited. The literature focuses on mechanisms with simple dominant strategies, but…
Most familiar equilibrium concepts, such as Nash and correlated equilibrium, guarantee only that no single player can improve their utility by deviating unilaterally. They offer no guarantees against profitable coordinated deviations by…
We introduce a strategic behavior in reinsurance bilateral transactions, where agents choose the risk preferences they will appear to have in the transaction. Within a wide class of risk measures, we identify agents' strategic choices to a…
In this paper, we address the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in non-cooperative convex games with partial-decision information. We propose a distributed algorithm, where each agent refines its strategy through projected-gradient…
A truthful mechanism for a Bayesian single-item auction results with some ex-ante revenue for the seller, and some ex-ante total surplus for the buyers. We study the Pareto frontier of the set of seller-buyers ex-ante utilities, generated…
Allocating items in a fair and economically efficient manner is a central problem in fair division. We study this problem for agents with additive preferences, when items are all goods or all chores, divisible or indivisible. The celebrated…
The main objective of this paper is to look from the unique point of view at some phenomena arising in different areas of probability theory and mathematical statistics. We will try to understand what is common between classical…
Voters making a binary decision purchase votes from a centralized clearing house, paying the square of the number of votes purchased. The net payoff to an agent with utility $u$ who purchases $v$ votes is $\Psi (S_{n+1})u-v^{2}$, where…