Related papers: Cycles of cooperation and defection in imperfect l…
Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player's strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficult to recognize someone's strategy just by observing the…
We use analytical techniques based on an expansion in the inverse system size to study the stochastic evolutionary dynamics of finite populations of players interacting in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We show that a mechanism of…
We will study a population of individuals playing the infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma under replicator dynamics. The population consists of three kinds of individuals using the following reactive strategies: ALLD (individuals which…
Learning in games refers to scenarios where multiple players interact in a shared environment, each aiming to minimize their regret. An equilibrium can be computed at a fast rate of $O(1/T)$ when all players follow the optimistic…
I present the results from a spatial model of the prisoner's dilemma, played on a toroidal lattice. Each individual has a default strategy of either cooperating ($C$) or defecting ($D$). Two strategies were tested, including ``tit-for-tat''…
Direct reciprocity, stemming from repeated interactions among players, is one of the fundamental mechanisms for understanding the evolution of cooperation. However, canonical strategies for the repeated prisoner's dilemma, such as…
To understand the emergence and sustainment of cooperative behavior in interacting collectives, we perform global convergence analysis for replicator dynamics of a large, well-mixed population of individuals playing a repeated snowdrift…
The finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma is a good illustration of the discrepancy between the strategic behaviour suggested by a game-theoretic analysis and the behaviour often observed among human players, where cooperation is maintained…
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation…
Human decision behaviour is quite diverse. In many games humans on average do not achieve maximal payoff and the behaviour of individual players remains inhomogeneous even after playing many rounds. For instance, in repeated prisoner…
Interactions among individuals in natural populations often occur in a dynamically changing environment. Understanding the role of environmental variation in population dynamics has long been a central topic in theoretical ecology and…
Repeated interaction between individuals is the main mechanism for maintaining cooperation in social dilemma situations. Variants of tit-for-tat (repeating the previous action of the opponent) and the win-stay lose-shift strategy are known…
Oscillatory behaviors are ubiquitous in nature and the human society. However, most previous works fail to reproduce them in the two-strategy game-theoretical models. Here we show that oscillatory behaviors naturally emerge if incomplete…
The emergence of mutual cooperation is studied in a spatially extended evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game in which the players are located on the sites of cubic lattices for dimensions d=1, 2, and 3. Each player can choose one of the…
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed to support human decision-making. This use of LLMs has concerning implications, especially when their prescriptions affect the welfare of others. To gauge how LLMs make social…
Punishment is a common tactic to sustain cooperation and has been extensively studied for a long time. While most of previous game-theoretic work adopt the imitation learning where players imitate the strategies who are better off, the…
The prisoner's dilemma describes a conflict between a pair of players, in which defection is a dominant strategy whereas cooperation is collectively optimal. The iterated version of the dilemma has been extensively studied to understand the…
Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
In society, mutual cooperation, defection, and asymmetric exploitative relationships are common. Whereas cooperation and defection are studied extensively in the literature on game theory, asymmetric exploitative relationships between…