Related papers: The tragedy of the commons in a multi-population c…

We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…

We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…

The basic social dilemma is frequently captured by a public goods game where participants decide simultaneously whether to support a common pool or not and after the enhanced contributions are distributed uniformly among all competitors.…

Self-optimizing behaviors can lead to outcomes where collective benefits are ultimately destroyed, a well-known phenomenon known as the ``tragedy of the commons". These scenarios are widely studied using game-theoretic approaches to analyze…

Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where…

We study the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma game, where the risk is determined by a collective target that must be reached with individual contributions. All players initially receive endowments from the…

The public goods game is a famous example illustrating the tragedy of the commons. In this game cooperating individuals contribute to a pool, which in turn is distributed to all members of the group, including defectors who reap the same…

We study an ensemble of individuals playing the two games of the so-called Parrondo paradox. In our study, players are allowed to choose the game to be played by the whole ensemble in each turn. The choice cannot conform to the preferences…

We consider a version of large population games whose players compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. The system efficiency is measured by the variance of the decisions. In the regime where the system can be…

The complete cooperation and the complete defection are two typical strategies considered in evolutionary games in many previous works. However, in real life, strategies of individuals are full of variety rather than only two complete ones.…

Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because…

In this paper, we consider a mean field model of social behavior where there are an infinite number of players, each of whom observes a type privately that represents her preference, and publicly observes a mean field state of types and…

Wealthy individuals may be less tempted to defect than those with comparatively low payoffs. To take this into consideration, we introduce coevolutionary success-driven multigames in structured populations. While the core game is always the…

Cooperation and defection may be considered as two extreme responses to a social dilemma. Yet the reality is much less clear-cut. Between the two extremes lies an interval of ambivalent choices, which may be captured theoretically by means…

In the traditional setup of public goods game all players are involved in every available groups and the mutual benefit is shared among competing cooperator and defector strategies. But in real life situations the group formation of players…

Leaving the joint enterprise when defection is unveiled is always a viable option to avoid being exploited. Although loner strategy helps the population not to be trapped into the tragedy of the commons state, it could offer only a modest…

We consider two-player iterated survival games in which players may switch from a more cooperative behavior to a less cooperative one at some step of the game. Payoffs are survival probabilities and lone individuals have to finish the game…

This paper investigates the evolution of strategic play where players drawn from a finite well-mixed population are offered the opportunity to play in a public goods game. All players accept the offer. However, due to the possibility of…

In a social dilemma game group members are allowed to decide if they contribute to the joint venture or not. As a consequence, defectors, who do not invest but only enjoy the mutual benefit, prevail and the system evolves onto the tragedy…

This paper reframes approachability theory within the context of population games. Thus, whilst one player aims at driving her average payoff to a predefined set, her opponent is not malevolent but rather extracted randomly from a…