Related papers: Truthfulness via Proxies
A central problem in Microeconomics is to design auctions with good revenue properties. In this setting, the bidders' valuations for the items are private knowledge, but they are drawn from publicly known prior distributions. The goal is to…
We design online algorithms for the fair allocation of public goods to a set of $N$ agents over a sequence of $T$ rounds and focus on improving their performance using predictions. In the basic model, a public good arrives in each round,…
We study an auction setting in which bidders bid for placement of their content within a summary generated by a large language model (LLM), e.g., an ad auction in which the display is a summary paragraph of multiple ads. This generalizes…
We study multidimensional mechanism design in a common scenario where players have private information about their willingness to pay and their ability to pay. We provide a complete characterization of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible…
In {\em set-system auctions}, there are several overlapping teams of agents, and a task that can be completed by any of these teams. The buyer's goal is to hire a team and pay as little as possible. Recently, Karlin, Kempe and Tamir…
Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solution of a difficult optimization problem. This is true of mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, which have in recent years assumed practical…
We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving reduction from truthfully maximizing \emph{any} objective under…
This paper analyzes the correctness of the subsumption algorithm used in CLASSIC, a description logic-based knowledge representation system that is being used in practical applications. In order to deal efficiently with individuals in…
Algorithmic mechanism design (AMD) studies the delicate interplay between computational efficiency, truthfulness, and optimality. We focus on AMD's paradigmatic problem: combinatorial auctions. We present a new generalization of the VC…
We study combinatorial auctions for the secondary spectrum market. In this market, short-term licenses shall be given to wireless nodes for communication in their local neighborhood. In contrast to the primary market, channels can be…
Budget feasible mechanism considers algorithmic mechanism design questions where there is a budget constraint on the total payment of the mechanism. An important question in the field is that under which valuation domains there exist budget…
For product rating environments, similar to that of Amazon Reviews, it has been shown that the truthful elicitation of feedback is possible through mechanisms which pay buyer reports contingent on the reports of other buyers. We study…
We provide a deterministic algorithm that outputs an $O(n^{3/4} \log n)$-approximation for the Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) of two input sequences of length $n$ in near-linear time. This is the first deterministic approximation…
We introduce a lazy approach to the explanation-based approximation of probabilistic logic programs. It uses only the most significant part of the program when searching for explanations. The result is a fast and anytime approximate…
In this paper, we describe an attack against one of the Oblivious-Transfer-based blind signatures scheme, proposed in [1]. An attacker with a primitive capability of producing specific-range random numbers, while exhibiting a partial MITM…
This work addresses the problem of revenue maximization in a repeated, unlimited supply item-pricing auction while preserving buyer privacy. We present a novel algorithm that provides differential privacy with respect to the buyer's input…
We present a quantum auction protocol using superpositions to represent bids and distributed search to identify the winner(s). Measuring the final quantum state gives the auction outcome while simultaneously destroying the superposition.…
We consider prophet inequalities for XOS and MPH-$k$ combinatorial auctions and give a simplified proof for the existence of static and anonymous item prices which recover the state-of-the-art competitive ratios. Our proofs make use of a…
Continuous double auctions are commonly used to match orders at currency, stock, and commodities exchanges. A verified implementation of continuous double auctions is a useful tool for market regulators as they give rise to automated…
Distributed aggregative optimization methods are gaining increased traction due to their ability to address cooperative control and optimization problems, where the objective function of each agent depends not only on its own decision…