Related papers: Evolutionary Games defined at the Network Mesoscal…
In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation…
Elucidating the mechanisms that lead to cooperation is still one of the main scientific challenges of current times, as many common cooperative scenarios remain elusive and at odds with Darwin's natural selection theory. Here, we study…
Most papers about the evolutionary game on graph assume the statistic network structure. However, social interaction could change the relationship of people. And the changing social structure will affect the people's strategy too. We build…
In social situations with which evolutionary game is concerned, individuals are considered to be heterogeneous in various aspects. In particular, they may differently perceive the same outcome of the game owing to heterogeneity in…
Established already in the Biblical times, the Matthew effect stands for the fact that in societies rich tend to get richer and the potent even more powerful. Here we investigate a game theoretical model describing the evolution of…
Evolutionary games are a developing sub-field of game theory. This branch of game theory is used in the study of the adaptation of large, but finite, populations of agents to changes in the environment. It assumes that each agent has no…
Population structure affects the outcome of natural selection. Static population structures can be described by graphs, where individuals occupy the nodes, and interactions occur along the edges. General conditions for evolutionary success…
We study a coevolutionary public goods game on a dynamic hypergraph, where an individual's payoff directly determines the number of hyperedges it can join. In the proposed mechanism, nodes adjust their participation according to the group…
We explore the emergence of cooperation in the framework of evolutionary game theory. First we introduce the cooperation problem in a novel way that we believe it have important consequences in how problem is addressed. Then we present a…
We present a model that takes into account the coupling between evolutionary game dynamics and social influence. Importantly, social influence and game dynamics take place in different domains, which we model as different layers of a…
Using a new dynamical network model of society in which pairwise interactions are weighted according to mutual satisfaction, we show that cooperation is the norm in the Hawks-Doves game when individuals are allowed to break ties with…
Complex networks serve as abstract models for understanding real-world complex systems and provide frameworks for studying structured dynamical systems. This article addresses limitations in current studies on the exploration of individual…
Iterated games provide a framework to describe social interactions among groups of individuals. Recent work stimulated by the discovery of "zero-determinant" strategies has rapidly expanded our ability to analyze such interactions. This…
Addressing the question of how to achieve optimal decision-making under risk and uncertainty is crucial for enhancing the capabilities of artificial agents that collaborate with or support humans. In this work, we address this question in…
Scientific coauthorship, generated by collaborations and competitions among researchers, reflects effective organizations of human resources. Researchers, their expected benefits through collaborations, and their cooperative costs…
A stochastic model for behavioral changes by imitative pair interactions of individuals is developed. `Microscopic' assumptions on the specific form of the imitative processes lead to a stochastic version of the game dynamical equations.…
Understanding the evolution of cooperation is pivotal in biology and social science. Public resources sharing is a common scenario in the real world. In our study, we explore the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation on a regular graph with…
The environment has a strong influence on a population's evolutionary dynamics. Driven by both intrinsic and external factors, the environment is subject to continual change in nature. To capture an ever-changing environment, we consider a…
We study the evolutionary dynamics of games under environmental feedback using replicator equations for two interacting populations. One key feature is to consider jointly the co-evolution of the dynamic payoff matrices and the state of the…
The interdependence between an individual strategy decision and the resulting change of environmental state is often a subtle process. Feedback-evolving games have been a prevalent framework for studying such feedback in well-mixed…