Related papers: Reciprocating Preferences Stablize Matching: Colle…
The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…
We introduce the {\sc classified stable matching} problem, a problem motivated by academic hiring. Suppose that a number of institutes are hiring faculty members from a pool of applicants. Both institutes and applicants have preferences…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
Consider the standard hospitals/residents problem, or the two-sided many-to-one stable matching problem, and assume that the true preference lists of both sides are complete and strict. The lists actually submitted, however, are truncated.…
We focus on an online 2-stage problem, motivated by the following situation: consider a system where students shall be assigned to universities. There is a first round where some students apply, and a first (stable) matching $M_1$ has to be…
This paper introduces a novel measurement of informational size to school choice problems, which inherits its ideas from Mount and Reiter (1974). This concept measures a matching mechanism's information size by counting the maximal relevant…
We study a many-to-one matching problem, such as the college admission problem, where each college can admit multiple students. Unlike classical models, colleges evaluate sets of students through non-linear utility functions that capture…
This study considers a model where schools may have multiple priority orders on students, which may be inconsistent with each other. For example, in school choice systems, since the sibling priority and the walk zone priority coexist, the…
We show, that a simple generalization of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with firms proposing due to Gale and Shapley(1962), yeild outcomes for a two-sided contract choice problem, which necessarily belong to the core and are Weakly…
Course assignment is a wide-spread problem in education and beyond. Often students have preferences for bundles of course seats or course schedules over the week, which need to be considered. The problem is a challenging distributed…
The Stable Roommates problems are characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates. A solution is a partition of the agents into pairs that are acceptable to each other (i.e., they are in the preference lists of…
In two-sided matching market, when the regional constraints are present, the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm suffers from undesirable inefficiency due to the artificial allocation of the regional caps among hospitals. We show that, given…
Consider a university assigning students to courses and dorms. While many mechanisms are available, they each have their own drawbacks. Running serial dictatorship once for all goods is highly unfair, but running serial dictatorship…
Two-sided matching markets, environments in which two disjoint groups of agents seek to partner with one another, arise in several contexts. In static, centralized markets where agents know their preferences, standard algorithms can yield a…
Using school choice as a motivating example, we introduce a stylized model of a many-to-one matching market where the clearinghouse aims to implement contingent priorities, i.e., priorities that depend on the current assignment, to…
We study the admission control problem in general networks. Communication requests arrive over time, and the online algorithm accepts or rejects each request while maintaining the capacity limitations of the network. The admission control…
We study the problem of selecting the top-k candidates from a pool of applicants, where each candidate is associated with a score indicating his/her aptitude. Depending on the specific scenario, such as job search or college admissions,…
Prevailing methods of course allocation at undergraduate institutions involve reserving seats to give priority to designated groups of students. We introduce a competitive equilibrium-based mechanism that assigns course seats using student…
In preference-based reinforcement learning (RL), an agent interacts with the environment while receiving preferences instead of absolute feedback. While there is increasing research activity in preference-based RL, the design of formal…
In the assignment problem, a set of items must be allocated to unit-demand agents who express ordinal preferences (rankings) over the items. In the assignment problem with priorities, agents with higher priority are entitled to their…