Related papers: Notes on two elementary evolutionary games
Natural selection acts on traits at different scales, often with opposing consequences. This article identifies the particular forces that act at each scale and how those forces combine to determine the overall evolutionary outcome. A…
Cyclic dominant systems, like rock-paper-scissors game, are frequently used to explain biodiversity in nature, where mobility, reproduction and intransitive competition are on stage to provide the coexistence of competitors. A significantly…
We consider the dynamics, existence and stability of the equilibrium states for large populations of individuals who can play various types of non--cooperative games. The players imitate the most attractive strategies, and the choice is…
Game theoretic tools are utilized to analyze a one-locus continuous selection model of sex-specific meiotic drive by considering nonequivalence of the viabilities of reciprocal heterozygotes that might be noticed at an imprinted locus. The…
Interactions among living organisms, from bacteria colonies to human societies, are inherently more complex than interactions among particles and nonliving matter. Group interactions are a particularly important and widespread class,…
In the work two ways of evolutionary interpretation of entropy model for correspondence matrix calculation are proposed. Both approaches based on the stochastic chemical kinetic evolution under the detailed balance condition. The first…
Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological, evolutionary-ecological, and even psychological-economic systems. Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members, like tragedy of the…
We investigate the role of quantum mechanical effects in the central stability concept of evolutionary game theory i.e. an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS). Using two and three-player symmetric quantum games we show how the presence of…
This paper considers a two-dimensional logistic model to study populations with two genders. The growth behavior of a population is guided by two coupled ordinary differential equations given by a non-differentiable vector field whose…
We propose a formulation of a general-sum bimatrix game as a bipartite directed graph with the objective of establishing a correspondence between the set of the relevant structures of the graph (in particular elementary cycles) and the set…
Human societies around the world interact with each other by developing and maintaining social norms, and it is critically important to understand how such norms emerge and change. In this work, we define an evolutionary game-theoretic…
In this work, we discuss a number game that develops in a manner similar to that on which Gilbreath's conjecture on iterated absolute differences between consecutive primes is formulated. In our case the action occurs at the exponent level…
In this short paper we describe natural logit population games dynamics that explain equilibrium models of origin-destination matrix estimation and (stochastic) traffic assignment models (Beckmann, Nesterov--de Palma). Composition of the…
We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…
This paper suggests that the fundamental haploid-diploid cycle of eukaryotic sex exploits a rudimentary form of the Baldwin effect. With this explanation for the basic cycle, the other associated phenomena can be explained as evolution…
Ecology and evolution are inherently linked, and studying a mathematical model that considers both holds promise of insightful discoveries related to the dynamics of cooperation. In the present article, we use the prisoner's dilemma (PD)…
This manuscript contains nothing new, but synthesizes known results: For the theoretical population geneticist with a probabilistic background, we provide a summary of some key results on stochastic differential equations. For the…
We study first order evolutive Mean Field Games whose operators are non-coercive. This situation occurs, for instance, when some directions are `forbidden' to the generic player at some points. Under some regularity assumptions, we…
This paper introduces and analyses some models in the framework of Mean Field Games describing interactions between two populations motivated by the studies on urban settlements and residential choice by Thomas Schelling. For static games,…
This paper introduces a geometric framework for analyzing power relations in games, independent of their strategic form. We define a canonical preference space where each player's relational stance is a normalized vector. This model…