Related papers: Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games
Self-stabilization is an excellent approach for adding fault tolerance to a distributed multi-agent system. However, two properties of self-stabilization theory, convergence and closure, may not be satisfied if agents are selfish. To…
In this paper, we study multi-agent systems with decentralized resource allocations. Agents have local demand and resource supply, and are interconnected through a network designed to support sharing of the local resource; and the network…
Control of multi-agent systems via game theory is investigated. Assume a system level object is given, the utility functions for individual agents are designed to convert a multi-agent system into a potential game. First, for fixed…
The airport game is a classical and well-known model of fair cost-sharing for a single facility among multiple agents. This paper extends it to the so-called assignment setting, that is, for multiple facilities and agents, each agent…
In this paper, we study a routing and travel-mode choice problem for mobility systems with a multimodal transportation network as a ``mobility game" with coupled action sets. We develop a game-theoretic framework to study the impact on…
Multi-agent games in dynamic nonlinear settings are challenging due to the time-varying interactions among the agents and the non-stationarity of the (potential) Nash equilibria. In this paper we consider model-free games, where agent…
In this paper, we study a class of discrete-time mean-field games under the infinite-horizon risk-sensitive discounted-cost optimality criterion. Risk-sensitivity is introduced for each agent (player) via an exponential utility function. In…
This paper studies the connection between a class of mean-field games and a social welfare optimization problem. We consider a mean-field game in function spaces with a large population of agents, and each agent seeks to minimize an…
We study the dynamics and resulting score distribution of three-agent games where after each competition a single agent wins and scores a point. A single competition is described by a triplet of numbers $p$, $t$ and $q$ denoting the…
We study a game-theoretic variant of the maximum circulation problem. In a flow allocation game, we are given a directed flow network. Each node is a rational agent and can strategically allocate any incoming flow to the outgoing edges.…
We study the inefficiency of equilibria for various classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1-\alpha_i times his direct…
We present a framework that incorporates the idea of bounded rationality into dynamic stochastic pursuit-evasion games. The solution of a stochastic game is characterized, in general, by its (Nash) equilibria in feedback form. However,…
We consider a model of nomadic agents exploring and competing for time-varying location-specific resources, arising in crowdsourced transportation services, online communities, and in traditional location based economic activity. This model…
Principal-agent problems arise when one party acts on behalf of another, leading to conflicts of interest. The economic literature has extensively studied principal-agent problems, and recent work has extended this to more complex scenarios…
In this paper, we consider discrete-time dynamic games of the mean-field type with a finite number $N$ of agents subject to an infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. The state space of each agent is a locally compact Polish…
In this paper we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large number of competitors. Formally, $N$…
In this paper, we study a model of network formation in large populations. Each agent can choose the strength of interaction (i.e. connection) with other agents to find a Nash equilibrium. Different from the recently-developed theory of…
Collective intelligence emerges across biological, physical, and artificial systems without central coordination, yet a unifying principle governing such behaviour remains elusive. The Free Energy Principle explains how individual agents…
We analyze cooperative Cournot games with boundedly rational firms. Due to cogni- tive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional structure of the non-members. Thus, they compute their value using…
Despite many distributed resource allocation (DRA) algorithms have been reported in literature, it is still unknown how to allocate the resource optimally over multiple interacting coalitions. One major challenge in solving such a problem…