Related papers: Socio-economic utility and chemical potential
The optimization of power systems involves complex uncertainties, such as technological progress, political context, geopolitical constraints. Negotiations at COP21 are complicated by the huge number of scenarios that various people want to…
We study linear Fisher markets with satiation. In these markets, sellers have earning limits and buyers have utility limits. Beyond natural applications in economics, these markets arise in the context of maximizing Nash social welfare when…
We consider a one-sided assignment market or exchange network with transferable utility and propose a model for the dynamics of bargaining in such a market. Our dynamical model is local, involving iterative updates of 'offers' based on…
We study organizational elections in which each group nominates one candidate and receives as payoff its members expected utility under a probabilistic winning rule. We empirically justify a standard monotonicity assumption by simulating…
Agents attempt to maximize expected profits earned by selling multiple units of a perishable product where their revenue streams are affected by the prices they quote as well as the distribution of other prices quoted in the market by other…
Traders in a market typically have widely different, private information on the return of an asset. The equilibrium price of the asset may reflect this information more accurately if the number of traders is large enough compared to the…
We consider a market impact game for $n$ risk-averse agents that are competing in a market model with linear transient price impact and additional transaction costs. For both finite and infinite time horizons, the agents aim to minimize a…
This paper examines normatively acceptable criteria for evaluating social states when individuals are responsible for their skills or productivity and these factors should be accounted for. We consider social choice rules over sets of…
Having fixed capacities, homogeneous products and price sensitive customer purchase decision are primary distinguishing characteristics of numerous revenue management systems. Even with two or three rivals, competition is still highly…
In economics, construction of perfect models in a way that would be comparable to the standards customary in physical sciences is generally not feasible. In particular, the observed value for an economic equilibrium may deviate…
The fair division of resources is an important age-old problem that has led to a rich body of literature. At the center of this literature lies the question of whether there exist fair mechanisms despite strategic behavior of the agents. A…
This letter reports a novel application of game theory to quantum informational processes which can be used to optimally classify data generated by these processes. To this end, the notion of simultaneously distinguishing a pure quantum…
We consider a simple model of a closed economic system where the total money is conserved and the number of economic agents is fixed. In analogy to statistical systems in equilibrium, money and the average money per economic agent are…
Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at maximizing their own payoffs. There exists a game among these…
We consider a situation where wireless service providers compete for heterogenous wireless users. The users differ in their willingness to pay as well as in their individual channel gains. We prove existence and uniqueness of the Nash…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
This work investigates a modified Schelling model within the scope and aims of Social Physics. The main purpose is to see if how the concepts of potential and kinetic energy can be represented within a computational sociological system. A…
In a many-to-one matching market, we analyze the matching game induced by a stable rule when firms' choice function satisfy substitutability. We show that any stable rule implements the individually rational correspondence in Nash…
We consider a class of Wasserstein distributionally robust Nash equilibrium problems, where agents construct heterogeneous data-driven Wasserstein ambiguity sets using private samples and radii, in line with their individual risk-averse…
We present a novel model of a coupled hydrogen and electricity market on the intraday time scale, where hydrogen gas is used as a storage device for the electric grid. Electricity is produced by renewable energy sources or by extracting…