Related papers: Non-zero Sum Stochastic Differential Games of Full…
We consider dynamic games with linear dynamics and quadratic objective functions. We observe that the unconstrained open-loop Nash equilibrium coincides with a linear quadratic regulator in an augmented space, thus deriving an explicit…
We discuss a model of a two-person, non-cooperative stochastic game, inspired by the discrete version of the red-and-black gambling problem presented by Dubins and Savage. Assume that two players hold certain amounts of money. At each stage…
This paper investigates a cone-constrained two-player zero-sum stochastic linear-quadratic (SLQ) differential game for stochastic differential equations (SDEs) with regime switching and random coefficients driven by a jump-diffusion…
In this paper, we investigate the existence and characterization of the value for a two-player zero-sum differential game with symmetric incomplete information on a continuum of initial positions and with signal revelation. Before the game…
We consider 2-player zero-sum stochastic games where each player controls his own state variable living in a compact metric space. The terminology comes from gambling problems where the state of a player represents its wealth in a casino.…
In the nonzero-sum setting, we establish a connection between Nash equilibria in games of optimal stopping (Dynkin games) and generalised Nash equilibrium problems (GNEP). In the Dynkin game this reveals novel equilibria of threshold type…
This paper focuses on zero-sum stochastic differential games in the framework of forward-backward stochastic differential equations on a finite time horizon with both players adopting impulse controls. By means of BSDE methods, in…
For the classical backward induction algorithm, the input is an arbitrary $n$-person positional game with perfect information modeled by a finite acyclic directed graph (digraph) and the output is a profile $(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ of pure…
In game theory, the concept of Nash equilibrium reflects the collective stability of some individual strategies chosen by selfish agents. The concept pertains to different classes of games, e.g. the sequential games, where the agents play…
We consider stochastic differential games with $N$ players, linear-Gaussian dynamics in arbitrary state-space dimension, and long-time-average cost with quadratic running cost. Admissible controls are feedbacks for which the system is…
This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions for two-person zero-sum games with inf/sup-compact payoff functions and with possibly noncompact decision sets for both players. Payoff functions may be unbounded, and…
In this paper we consider two-person zero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic dynamic games with Borel state and action spaces and bounded reward. The term risk-sensitive refers to the fact that instead of the usual risk neutral optimization…
This paper investigates zero-sum stochastic linear quadratic (SLQ) differential games with Markovian jumps. Open-loop and closed-loop solvabilities are studied by employing a new ``decomposition method", which decomposes the open-loop and…
Probabilistic model checking for stochastic games enables formal verification of systems that comprise competing or collaborating entities operating in a stochastic environment. Despite good progress in the area, existing approaches focus…
In this paper, we study a class of two-player deterministic finite-horizon difference games with coupled inequality constraints, where each player has two types of decision variables: one involving sequential interactions and the other…
This work considers stochastic differential games with a large number of players, whose costs and dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. We develop a new framework to prove convergence…
In this paper we study infinite horizon nonzero-sum stochastic games for controlled discrete-time Markov chains on a Polish state space with risk-sensitive ergodic cost criterion. Under suitable assumptions we show that the associated…
Recent extensions to dynamic games of the well-known fictitious play learning procedure in static games were proved to globally converge to stationary Nash equilibria in two important classes of dynamic games (zero-sum and…
The study of games and their equilibria is central to developing insights for understanding many socio-economic phenomena. Here we present a dynamical systems view of the equilibria of two-person, payoff-symmetric games. In particular,…
The paper is concerned with a zero-sum continuous-time stochastic differential game with a dynamics controlled by a Markov process and a terminal payoff. The value function of the original game is estimated using the value function of a…