Related papers: E-loyalty networks in online auctions
Auctions via social network, pioneered by Li et al. (2017), have been attracting considerable attention in the literature of mechanism design for auctions. However, no known mechanism has satisfied strategy-proofness, non-deficit,…
We quantify the value of the monopoly's bargaining power in terms of competition complexity--that is, the number of additional bidders the monopoly must attract in simple auctions to match the expected revenue of the optimal mechanisms…
In an online fair allocation problem, a sequence of indivisible items arrives online and needs to be allocated to offline agents immediately and irrevocably. In our paper, we study the online allocation of either goods or chores. We employ…
Today, many auctions are carried out with the help of intermediary platforms like Google and eBay. We refer to such auctions as platform-assisted auctions.Traditionally, the auction theory literature mainly focuses on designing auctions…
In this paper, we study methods for improving the utility and privacy of reputation scores for online auctions, such as used in eBay, so as to reduce the effectiveness of feedback extortion. The main ideas behind our techniques are to use…
Online auctions play a central role in online advertising, and are one of the main reasons for the industry's scalability and growth. With great changes in how auctions are being organized, such as changing the second- to first-price…
This paper studies a sale promotion mechanism design problem on a social network, where a node (a seller) sells one item to the other nodes on the network to maximize her revenue. However, the seller does not know other nodes except for her…
Auction-based recommender systems are prevalent in online advertising platforms, but they are typically optimized to allocate recommendation slots based on immediate expected return metrics, neglecting the downstream effects of…
Sponsored search auctions constitute one of the most successful applications of microeconomic mechanisms. In mechanism design, auctions are usually designed to incentivize advertisers to bid their truthful valuations and to assure both the…
We study the problem of allocating $T$ sequentially arriving items among $n$ homogeneous agents under the constraint that each agent must receive a pre-specified fraction of all items, with the objective of maximizing the agents' total…
A mobile cloud computing system is composed of heterogeneous services and resources to be allocated by the cloud service provider to mobile cloud users. On one hand, some of these resources are substitutable (e.g., users can use storage…
We describe mechanisms for the allocation of a scarce resource among multiple users in a way that is efficient, fair, and strategy-proof, but when users do not know their resource requirements. The mechanism is repeated for multiple rounds…
This paper considers a novel variant of the online fair division problem involving multiple agents in which a learner sequentially observes an indivisible item that has to be irrevocably allocated to one of the agents while satisfying a…
The issue of fairness in AI arises from discriminatory practices in applications like job recommendations and risk assessments, emphasising the need for algorithms that do not discriminate based on group characteristics. This concern is…
We consider clustering games in which the players are embedded in a network and want to coordinate (or anti-coordinate) their strategy with their neighbors. The goal of a player is to choose a strategy that maximizes her utility given the…
Traditionally, the Bayesian optimal auction design problem has been considered either when the bidder values are i.i.d., or when each bidder is individually identifiable via her value distribution. The latter is a reasonable approach when…
Budget-management systems are one of the key components of modern auction markets. Internet advertising platforms typically offer advertisers the possibility to pace the rate at which their budget is depleted, through budget-pacing…
In online experimentation, appropriate metrics (e.g., purchase) provide strong evidence to support hypotheses and enhance the decision-making process. However, incomplete metrics are frequently occurred in the online experimentation, making…
Given a sample of bids from independent auctions, this paper examines the question of inference on auction fundamentals (e.g. valuation distributions, welfare measures) under weak assumptions on information structure. The question is…
Clique clustering is the problem of partitioning the vertices of a graph into disjoint clusters, where each cluster forms a clique in the graph, while optimizing some objective function. In online clustering, the input graph is given one…