Related papers: On the arithmetization of syntax
The standard interpretation of first-order number theory (PA), according to the generally accepted view, associates well-defined set-theoretic entities with each and every well-formed formula of this system. But this implies that the class…
We offer a mathematical proof of consistency for Peano Arithmetic PA formalizable in PA. This result is compatible with Goedel's Second Incompleteness Theorem since our consistency proof does not rely on the representation of consistency as…
In much discussed work Artemov has recently shown that, for $\mathrm{PA}$, the consistency schema admits a form of uniform verification via selector proofs, despite the unprovability of the corresponding uniform consistency sentence…
Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem is generalized to definable theories, which are not necessarily recursively enumerable, by using a couple of syntactic-semantic notions, one is the consistency of a theory with the set of all true…
G\"odel's argument for the First Incompleteness Theorem is, structurally, a proof by contradiction. This article intends to reframe the argument by, first, isolating an additional assumption the argument relies on, and then, second, arguing…
This proof of Godel's first incompleteness theorem doesn't require omega-consistency, nor does it refer to codes of negated sentences as in Rosser's. It begins from where Godel's usual proof ends, and stalks it till it ends proving it.
It is proved that if $T$ is a $\Sigma_{n+1}$ Definable theory which is $\Sigma_n$-sound and extends $PA$, then $T$ can not prove the sentence $\Sigma_n-sound(T)$ that expresses the $\Sigma_n$-soundness of $T$. Optimality of this result is…
G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem is standardly understood as showing that no sufficiently strong, consistent theory of arithmetic can prove its own consistency, a result typically interpreted against a model-theoretic background in…
Based on the MRDP theorem concerning the Hilbert tenth problem, there is a corresponding Diophantine equation called proof equation for every formula of the First-order Peano Arithmetic (PA). A formula is provable in PA, if and only if the…
In this paper, we argue that formal systems of first order Arithmetic that admit Goedelian undecidable propositions validly are abnormally non-constructive. We argue that, in such systems, the strong representation of primitive recursive…
We conclude from Goedel's Theorem VII of his seminal 1931 paper that every recursive function f(x_{1}, x_{2}) is representable in the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA by a formula [F(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3})] which is algorithmically verifiable,…
A new viewpoint of the G\"odel's incompleteness theorem be given in this article which reveals the deep relationship between the logic and computation. Upon the results of these studies, an algorithm be given which shows how to search a…
We consider the foundational relation between arithmetic and set theory. Our goal is to criticize the construction of standard arithmetic models as providing grounds for arithmetic truth (even in a relative sense). Our method is to…
Based on the MRDP theorem, we introduce the ideas of the proof equation of a formula and universal proof equation of Peano Arithmetic (PA); and then, combining universal proof equation and G\"odel's Second Incompleteness Theorem, it is…
Non-compact proofs are a class of reasoning that is used in mathematics but overlooked in the analysis of (un)provability of consistency. We focus on proofs of arithmetical statements (*) "for any natural number n, F(n)." A proof of (*) is…
We first partly develop a mathematical notion of stable consistency intended to reflect the actual consistency property of human beings. Then we give a generalization of the first and second G\"odel incompleteness theorem to stably…
Proofs are traditionally syntactic, inductively generated objects. This paper reformulates first-order logic (predicate calculus) with proofs which are graph-theoretic rather than syntactic. It defines a combinatorial proof of a formula…
Standard interpretations of Goedel's "undecidable" proposition, [(Ax)R(x)], argue that, although [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable if [(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable, we may not conclude from this that [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable. We show that such…
A detailed and rigorous analysis of G\"odel's proof of his first incompleteness theorem is presented. The purpose of this analysis is two-fold. The first is to reveal what G\"odel actually proved to provide a clear and solid foundation upon…
In this note we observe that automated theorem provers (ATPs) that recursively enumerate theorems in a particular way will fail to identify some valid theorems for a reason that is analogous to how G\"odel proved the existence of what are…