Related papers: Equilibrium in Two-Player Non-Zero-Sum Dynkin Game…
We study a model of interacting run-and-tumble random walkers operating under mutual hardcore exclusion on a one-dimensional lattice with periodic boundary conditions. We incorporate a finite, Poisson-distributed, tumble duration so that a…
We study zero-sum games in the space of probability distributions over the Euclidean space $\mathbb{R}^d$ with entropy regularization, in the setting when the interaction function between the players is smooth and strongly convex-strongly…
This paper investigates the two-person zero-sum stochastic games for piece-wise deterministic Markov decision processes with risk-sensitive finite-horizon cost criterion on a general state space. Here, the transition and cost/reward rates…
The Lipschitz constant of a finite normal-form game is the maximal change in some player's payoff when a single opponent changes his strategy. We prove that games with small Lipschitz constant admit pure {\epsilon}-equilibria, and pinpoint…
On a filtered probability space $(\Omega,\mathcal{F},P,\mathbb{F}=(\mathcal{F}_t)_{t=0,\dotso,T})$, we consider stopper-stopper games $\overline V:=\inf_{\Rho\in\bT^{ii}}\sup_{\tau\in\T}\E[U(\Rho(\tau),\tau)]$ and $\underline…
We study a mean-field game of optimal stopping and investigate the existence of strong solutions via a connection with the Bank-El Karoui's representation problem. Under certain continuity assumptions, where the common noise is generated by…
This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley's foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We focus on markets where agents have utility functions and…
In this paper, the known deterministic linear-quadratic Stackelberg game is revisited, whose open-loop Stackelberg solution actually possesses the nature of time inconsistency. To handle this time inconsistency, {a two-tier game framework…
We prove that positive recursive general quitting games, which are quitting games in which each player may have more than one continue action, admit a sunspot $\ep$-equilibrium, for every $\ep > 0$. To this end we show that the equilibrium…
We prove that a deterministic n-person shortest path game has a Nash equlibrium in pure and stationary strategies if it is edge-symmetric (that is (u,v) is a move whenever (v,u) is, apart from moves entering terminal vertices) and the…
Mean field games formalize dynamic games with a continuum of players and explicit interaction where the players can have heterogeneous states. As they additionally yield approximate equilibria of corresponding $N$-player games, they are of…
In \emph{zero-sum two-player hidden stochastic games}, players observe partial information about the state. We address: $(i)$ the existence of the \emph{uniform value}, i.e., a limiting average payoff that both players can guarantee for…
A game-theoretic framework for time-inconsistent stopping problems where the time-inconsistency is due to the consideration of a non-linear function of an expected reward is developed. A class of mixed strategy stopping times that allows…
We study a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with asymmetric information where the payoff depends on a controlled continuous-time Markov chain X with finite state space which is only observed by player 1. This model was…
We consider the general model of zero-sum repeated games (or stochastic games with signals), and assume that one of the players is fully informed and controls the transitions of the state variable. We prove the existence of the uniform…
We examine a two-person game we call Will-Testing in which the strategy space for both players is a real number. It has no equilibrium. When an infinitely large set of players plays this in all possible pairings, there is an equilibrium for…
We show that in any $n$-player $m$-action normal-form game, we can obtain an approximate equilibrium by sampling any mixed-action equilibrium a small number of times. We study three types of equilibria: Nash, correlated and coarse…
We formulate and study a two-player static duel game as a nonzero-sum discounted stochastic game. Players $P_{1},P_{2}$ are standing in place and, in each turn, one or both may shoot at the other player. If $P_{n}$ shoots at $P_{m}$ ($m\neq…
We obtain a verification theorem for solving a Dynkin game driven by a L\'evy process. The result requires finding two averaging functions that, composed respectively with the supremum and the infimum of the process, summed, and taked the…
We study the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria in concurrent games played on graphs. While existence is guaranteed with safety objectives for each player, Nash equilibria need not exist when players are given arbitrary terminal-reward…