Related papers: Dense-Coding Attack on Three-Party Quantum Key Dis…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum message encryption protocols promise a secure way to distribute information while detecting eavesdropping. However, current protocols may suffer from significantly reduced eavesdropping protection…
This paper presents a simple, but efficient class of non-interactive protocols for quantum authentication of $m$-length clas sical messages. The message is encoded using a classical linear algebraic code $C[n,m,t]$. We assume that Alice and…
We proposed a scheme of continuous-variable quantum key distribution, in which the bright Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen entangled optical beams are utilized. The source of the entangled beams is placed inside the receiving station, where half of…
Recently, Zhang, Li, and Guo have proposed a particular eavesdropping attack [Phys. Rev. A {\bf 63}, 036301 (2001), quant-ph/0009042] which shows that my quantum key distribution protocol based on entanglement swapping [Phys. Rev. A {\bf…
The fabrication of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems typically involves several parties, thus providing Eve with multiple opportunities to meddle with the devices. As a consequence, conventional hardware and/or software hacking attacks…
Entanglement swapping between Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs can be used to generate the same sequence of random bits in two remote places. A quantum key distribution protocol based on this idea is described. The scheme exhibits the…
We present a continuous variable (CV) quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme based on the CV quantum teleportation of coherent states that yields a raw secret key made up of discrete variables for both Alice and Bob. This protocol preserves…
In a Letter, Cabello proposed a quantum key distribution (QKD) Protocol which attended to Holevo limit. In this comment, we show that Eve could use a simple plan to distinguish among quantum keys, without being detected by Alice and Bob. In…
In this article we present a new prepare and measure quantum key distribution protocol that decouples the necessary quantum channel error estimation from its dependency on sifting, or otherwise post-selecting, the detection outcomes. Rather…
We experimentally demonstrate a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol using photon pairs entangled in orbit angular momentum (OAM). In our protocol, Alice and Bob modulate their OAM states on each entangled pair with spatial light…
The quantum dense coding (DC) protocol, which has no security feature, deals with the transmission of classical information encoded in a quantum state by using shared entanglement between a single sender and a single receiver. Its…
Many quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes are based on sending and measuring qubits -- two-dimensional quantum systems. Yet, in practical realizations and experiments, the measuring devices at the receiver's (Bob) site commonly do not…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) permits information-theoretically secure transmission of digital encryption keys, assuming that the behaviour of the devices employed for the key exchange can be reliably modelled and predicted. Remarkably, no…
A deterministic direct quantum communication protocol by using swapping quantum entanglement and local unitary operations is proposed in this paper. A set of ordered EPR pairs in one of the four Bell states is used. For each pair, each of…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties to establish a shared secret key that is secure against all-powerful adversaries. One such protocol named B92 is quite appealing due to its simplicity but is highly sensitive to channel…
The security of source has become an increasingly important issue in quantum cryptography. Based on the framework of measurement-device-independent quantum-key-distribution (MDI-QKD), the source becomes the only region exploitable by a…
An eavesdropper Eve may probe a quantum key distribution (QKD) system by sending a bright pulse from the quantum channel into the system and analyzing the back-reflected pulses. Such Trojan-horse attacks can breach the security of the QKD…
While ideal quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are well-understood, practical implementations face various vulnerabilities, such as side-channel attacks resulting from device imperfections. Current security proofs for decoy-state BB84…
So far all the proven unconditionally secure prepare and measure protocols for the quantum key distribution(QKD) must solve the very complex problem of decoding the classical CSS code. In the decoding stage, Bob has to compare his string…
In this Reply we propose a modified security proof of the Quantum Dense Key Distribution protocol detecting also the eavesdropping attack proposed by Wojcik in his Comment.