Related papers: Social interaction as a heuristic for combinatoria…

How can a social planner adaptively incentivize selfish agents who are learning in a strategic environment to induce a socially optimal outcome in the long run? We propose a two-timescale learning dynamics to answer this question in both…

The Axelrod model for the dissemination of culture exhibits a rich spatial distribution of cultural domains, which depends on the values of the two model parameters: $F$, the number of cultural features and $q$, the common number of states…

We consider the problem of controlling the group behavior of a large number of dynamic systems that are constantly interacting with each other. These systems are assumed to have identical dynamics (e.g., birds flock, robot swarm) and their…

Nash`s classical bargaining solution suggests that n players in a non-cooperative bargaining situation should find a solution that maximizes the product of each player's utility functions. We consider a special case: Suppose that the…

The Bayesian persuasion paradigm of strategic communication models interaction between a privately-informed agent, called the sender, and an ignorant but rational agent, called the receiver. The goal is typically to design a (near-)optimal…

This paper considers distributed optimization problems, where each agent cooperatively minimizes the sum of local objective functions through the communication with its neighbors. The widely adopted distributed gradient method in solving…

We propose an adaptive incentive mechanism that learns the optimal incentives in environments where players continuously update their strategies. Our mechanism updates incentives based on each player's externality, defined as the difference…

This paper proposes a novel game-theoretical autonomous decision-making framework to address a task allocation problem for a swarm of multiple agents. We consider cooperation of self-interested agents, and show that our proposed…

We study the problem of distributed cooperative learning, where a group of agents seeks to agree on a set of hypotheses that best describes a sequence of private observations. In the scenario where the set of hypotheses is large, we propose…

We consider the framework of average aggregative games, where the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. We focus on the case in which the agents are coupled not only via their cost…

We investigate the problem of cross-cultural interactions through mass media in a model where two populations of social agents, each with its own internal dynamics, get information about each other through reciprocal global interactions. As…

We study the one-dimensional version of Axelrod's model of cultural transmission from the point of view of optimization dynamics. We show the existence of a Lyapunov potential for the dynamics. The global minimum of the potential, or…

Models of economic decision makers often include idealized assumptions, such as rationality, perfect foresight, and access to all relevant pieces of information. These assumptions often assure the models' internal validity, but, at the same…

In this work we introduce an evolutionary strategy to solve combinatorial optimization tasks, i.e. problems characterized by a discrete search space. In particular, we focus on the Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP), i.e. a famous problem…

We consider the setting of agents cooperatively minimizing the sum of local objectives plus a regularizer on a graph. This paper proposes a primal-dual method in consideration of three distinctive attributes of real-life multi-agent…

Rogers' diffusion of innovations theory asserts that cultural similarity among individuals plays a crucial role in the acceptance of an innovation in a community. However, most studies on the diffusion of innovations have relied on…

In this work, we study stochastic one-shot games where agents' utilities depend on the collective strategy profiles of other agents as well as on some well-behaved randomness. While each decision-maker is agnostic to the random variable's…

We study a class of distributionally robust games where agents are allowed to heterogeneously choose their risk aversion with respect to distributional shifts of the uncertainty. In our formulation, heterogeneous Wasserstein ball…

Natural languages have been argued to evolve under pressure to efficiently compress meanings into words by optimizing the Information Bottleneck (IB) complexity-accuracy tradeoff. However, the underlying social dynamics that could drive the…

Multi-agent interactions, such as communication, teaching, and bluffing, often rely on higher-order social inference, i.e., understanding how others infer oneself. Such intricate reasoning can be effectively modeled through nested…