Related papers: Dynamically generated cyclic dominance in spatial …
We study the evolution of cooperation within the spatial prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice where a fraction of players $\mu$ can spread their strategy more easily than the rest due to a predetermined larger teaching capability. In…
Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…
Punishment and partner switching are two well-studied mechanisms that support the evolution of cooperation. Observation of human behaviour suggests that the extent to which punishment is adopted depends on the usage of alternative…
We study effects of strategy-dependent time delays on equilibria of evolving populations. It is well known that time delays may cause oscillations in dynamical systems. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that microscopic models of…
We study a spatial two-strategy (cooperation and defection) Prisoner's Dilemma game with two types ($A$ and $B$) of players located on the sites of a square lattice. The evolution of strategy distribution is governed by iterated strategy…
A two-dimensional small-world type network, subject to spatial prisoners' dilemma dynamics and containing an influential node defined as a special node with a finite density of directed random links to the other nodes in the network, is…
It is generally believed that in a situation where individual and collective interests are in conflict, the availability of optional participation is a key mechanism to maintain cooperation. Surprisingly, this effect is sensitive to the use…
We study an evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game where the fitness of the players is determined by both the payoffs from the current interaction and their history. We consider the situation where the selection timescale is slower…
A simplified prisoner's game is studied on a square lattice when the players interacting with their neighbors can follow only two strategies: to cooperate (C) or to defect (D) unconditionally. The players updated in a random sequence have a…
We investigate the spatial distribution and the global frequency of agents who can either cooperate or defect. The agent interaction is described by a deterministic, non-iterated prisoner's dilemma game, further each agent only locally…
We study a spatial Prisoner's dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner's Dilemma games with their 24 nearest neighbors. The…
The prototype of a cyclic dominant system is the so-called rock-scissors-paper game, but similar relation among competing strategies can be identified in several other models of evolutionary game theory. In this work we assume that a…
We present a collaboration ring model -- a network of players playing the prisoner's dilemma game and collaborating among the nearest neighbours by forming coalitions. The microscopic stochastic updating of the players' strategies are…
Exploration of mechanisms underlying the emergence of collective cooperation remains a focal point in field of evolution of cooperation. Prevailing studies often neglect historical information, relying on the latest rewards as the primary…
Human decision behaviour is quite diverse. In many games humans on average do not achieve maximal payoff and the behaviour of individual players remains inhomogeneous even after playing many rounds. For instance, in repeated prisoner…
A modified spatial prisoner's dilemma game with voluntary participation in Newman-Watts small-world networks is studied. Some reasonable ingredients are introduced to the game evolutionary dynamics: each agent in the network is a pure…
The Prisoner's dilemma is the main game theoretical framework in which the onset and maintainance of cooperation in biological populations is studied. In the spatial version of the model, we study the robustness of cooperation in…
In a social dilemma situation, where individual and collective interests are in conflict, it sounds a reasonable assumption that the presence of super or smart players, who simultaneously punish defection and reward cooperation without…
Individuals might abstain from participating in an instance of an evolutionary game for various reasons, ranging from lack of interest to risk aversion. In order to understand the consequences of such diverse activity patterns on the…
We investigate the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game in structured populations by introducing dimers, which are defined as that two players in each dimer always hold a same strategy. We find that influences of dimers on cooperation…