Related papers: Stable partitions in additively separable hedonic …
We establish that the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) threshold problem for mean-payoff games is NP-complete. While the SPE threshold problem was recently shown to be decidable (in doubly exponential time) and NP-hard, its exact worst…
An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…
Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…
The paper defines a non-cooperative simultaneous finite game to study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities. The novelty of the game is that the game definition embeds a \textit{coalition structure…
We give a converging semidefinite programming hierarchy of outer approximations for the set of quantum correlations of fixed dimension and derive analytical bounds on the convergence speed of the hierarchy. In particular, we give a…
Applications, such as military and disaster response, can benefit from robotic collectives' ability to perform multiple cooperative tasks (e.g., surveillance, damage assessments) efficiently across a large spatial area. Coalition formation…
We study the 3D-Euclidean Multidimensional Stable Roommates problem, which asks whether a given set $V$ of $s\cdot n$ agents with a location in 3-dimensional Euclidean space can be partitioned into $n$ disjoint subsets $\pi = \{R_1 ,\dots ,…
Worst-case hardness results for most equilibrium computation problems have raised the need for beyond-worst-case analysis. To this end, we study the smoothed complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in Network Coordination Games, a…
For multiparametric mixed-integer convex programming problems such as those encountered in hybrid model predictive control, we propose an algorithm for generating a feasible partition of a subset of the parameter space. The result is a…
A group of $n$ agents with numerical preferences for each other are to be assigned to the $n$ seats of a dining table. We study two natural topologies:~circular (cycle) tables and panel (path) tables. For a given seating arrangement, an…
In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting of cooperative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they are all feasible. In…
Finding a stable matching is one of the central problems in algorithmic game theory. If participants are allowed to have ties and incomplete preferences, computing a stable matching of maximum cardinality is known to be NP-hard. In this…
This paper considers a dynamic game with transferable utilities (TU), where the characteristic function is a continuous-time bounded mean ergodic process. A central planner interacts continuously over time with the players by choosing the…
An edge-weighted, vertex-capacitated graph G is called stable if the value of a maximum-weight capacity-matching equals the value of a maximum-weight fractional capacity-matching. Stable graphs play a key role in characterizing the…
It is pointed out that separability problem for arbitrary multi-partite states can be fully solved by a finite size, elementary recursive algorithm. In the worse case scenario, the underlying numerical procedure, may grow doubly…
The rapid growth of data-driven technologies and the emergence of various data-sharing paradigms have underscored the need for efficient and stable data exchange protocols. In any such exchange, agents must carefully balance the benefit of…
A strategy profile in a multi-player game is a Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally deviate to achieve a strictly better payoff. A profile is an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium if no player can gain more than $\epsilon$ by…
In many multiagent environments, a designer has some, but limited control over the game being played. In this paper, we formalize this by considering incompletely specified games, in which some entries of the payoff matrices can be chosen…
We describe algorithms for computing eigenpairs (eigenvalue-eigenvector pairs) of a complex $n\times n$ matrix $A$. These algorithms are numerically stable, strongly accurate, and theoretically efficient (i.e., polynomial-time). We do not…
Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently introduced in arXiv:1307.2145, arXiv:1403.4958. We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems: can a given…