Related papers: Approximation Algorithms for Secondary Spectrum Au…
In secondary spectrum trading markets, auctions are widely used by spectrum holders (SHs) to redistribute their unused channels to secondary wireless service providers (WSPs). As sellers, the SHs design proper auction schemes to stimulate…
Ad exchanges are an emerging platform for trading advertisement slots on the web with billions of dollars revenue per year. Every time a user visits a web page, the publisher of that web page can ask an ad exchange to auction off the ad…
As the communication network is in transition towards a commercial one controlled by service providers (SP), the present paper considers a pricing game in a communication market covered by several wireless access points sharing the same…
A few years ago various disparities for Laplacians on graphs and manifolds were discovered. The corresponding results are mostly related to volume growth in the context of unbounded geometry. Indeed, these disparities can now be resolved by…
Recent work has shown that adaptive CSMA algorithms can achieve throughput optimality. However, these adaptive CSMA algorithms assume a rather simplistic model for the wireless medium. Specifically, the interference is typically modelled by…
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central problem in Auction Design. While theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits, a recent research direction initiated by Duetting et al.…
The emergence of real-time auction in online advertising has drawn huge attention of modeling the market competition, i.e., bid landscape forecasting. The problem is formulated as to forecast the probability distribution of market price for…
We consider the problem of an auctioneer who faces the task of selling a good (drawn from a known distribution) to a set of buyers, when the auctioneer does not have the capacity to describe to the buyers the exact identity of the good that…
Based on the theory of the Federal Communications Commission, the spectrum available on cognitive radio networks is limit and the non-optimal use of the spectrum necessitates the need for a telecommunications model, so that this pattern can…
We initiate the study of the social welfare loss caused by corrupt auctioneers, both in single-item and multi-unit auctions. In our model, the auctioneer may collude with the winning bidders by letting them lower their bids in exchange for…
In this paper, we study the broadcast problem in wireless networks when the broadcast is helped by a labelling scheme. We focus on two variants of broadcast: broadcast without acknowledgment (i.e. the initiator of the broadcast is not…
Vehicular cloud computing has emerged as a promising solution to fulfill users' demands on processing computation-intensive applications in modern driving environments. Such applications are commonly represented by graphs consisting of…
Online auction scenarios, such as bidding searches on advertising platforms, often require bidders to participate repeatedly in auctions for identical or similar items. Most previous studies have only considered the process by which the…
In cognitive radio networks (CRNs), spectrum trading is an efficient way for secondary users (SUs) to achieve dynamic spectrum access and to bring economic benefits for the primary users (PUs). Existing methods requires full payment from…
Budget constraints are ubiquitous in online advertisement auctions. To manage these constraints and smooth out the expenditure across auctions, the bidders (or the platform on behalf of them) often employ pacing: each bidder is assigned a…
This work presents a descending-price-auction algorithm to obtain the maximum market-clearing price vector (MCP) in unit-demand matching markets with m items by exploiting the combinatorial structure. With a shrewd choice of goods for which…
The European power grid can be divided into several market areas where the price of electricity is determined in a day-ahead auction. Market participants can provide continuous hourly bid curves and combinatorial bids with associated…
We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…
We investigate a spectrum oligopoly market where primaries lease their channels to secondaries in lieu of financial remuneration. Transmission quality of a channel evolves randomly. Each primary has to select the price it would quote…
We study the communication complexity of combinatorial auctions via interpolation mechanisms that interpolate between non-truthful and truthful protocols. Specifically, an interpolation mechanism has two phases. In the first phase, the…