Related papers: Strategic Information Exchange
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
Zero-sum asymmetric games model decision making scenarios involving two competing players who have different information about the game being played. A particular case is that of nested information, where one (informed) player has superior…
Players are statistical learners who learn about payoffs from data. They may interpret the same data differently, but have common knowledge of a class of learning procedures. I propose a metric for the analyst's "confidence" in a strategic…
In the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, when every player has a different discount factor, the grim-trigger strategy is an equilibrium if and only if the discount factor of each player is higher than some threshold. What happens if the players…
In imperfect information games, the evaluation of a game state not only depends on the observable world but also relies on hidden parts of the environment. As accessing the obstructed information trivialises state evaluations, one approach…
Bayesian rationality in strategic games presumes that it is possible to translate strategic uncertainty into imperfect information. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and…
We study a game of strategic information design between a sender, who chooses state-dependent information structures, a mediator who can then garble the signals generated from these structures, and a receiver who takes an action after…
Using methods from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems we analyze the properties of bimatrix games with random payoffs in the limit where the number of pure strategies of each player tends to infinity. We analytically calculate…
We study the value and the optimal strategies for a two-player zero-sum optimal stopping game with incomplete and asymmetric information. In our Bayesian set-up, the drift of the underlying diffusion process is unknown to one player…
In this paper, we investigate the existence and characterization of the value for a two-player zero-sum differential game with symmetric incomplete information on a continuum of initial positions and with signal revelation. Before the game…
Empirically, many strategic settings are characterized by stable outcomes in which players' decisions are publicly observed, yet no player takes the opportunity to deviate. To analyze such situations in the presence of incomplete…
For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with $K$ time steps and a player action space of size $U$, the game tree complexity is $U^{2K}$, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite $(U,K)$,…
The classical, complete-information two-player games assume that the problem data (in particular the payoff matrix) is known exactly by both players. In a now famous result, Nash has shown that any such game has an equilibrium in mixed…
We study a discrete-time finite-horizon two-players nonzero-sum stopping game where the filtration of Player 1 is richer than the filtration of Player 2. A major difficulty which is caused by the information asymmetry is that Player 2 may…
We study the problem of Bayesian learning in a dynamical system involving strategic agents with asymmetric information. In a series of seminal papers in the literature, this problem has been investigated under a simplifying model where…
Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…
We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender's approval is crucial to…
For zero-sum two-player continuous-time games with integral payoff and incomplete information on one side, one shows that the optimal strategy of the informed player can be computed through an auxiliary optimization problem over some…
Imperfect-information multiplayer games test whether agents can act under hidden information, sparse rewards, and non-stationary opponents. We study these challenges in Big 2, a four-player imperfect-information card game. We develop a…
Winners-take-all situations introduce an incentive for agents to diversify their behavior, since doing so will result in splitting an eventual price with fewer people. At the same time, when the payoff of a process depends on a parameter…