Related papers: Quantifying Information Leak Vulnerabilities
Quantitative theories of information flow give us an approach to relax the absolute confidentiality properties that are difficult to satisfy for many practical programs. The classical information-theoretic approaches for sequential…
Leakage errors arise when the quantum state leaks out of some subspace of interest, for example, the two-level subspace of a multi-level system defining a computational `qubit' or the logical code space defined by some quantum…
Quantitative information flow (QIF) is concerned with measuring how much of a secret is leaked to an adversary who observes the result of a computation that uses it. Prior work has shown that QIF techniques based on abstract interpretation…
In a software system it is possible to quantify the amount of information that is leaked or corrupted by analysing the flows of information present in the source code. In a cyber-physical system, information flows are not only present at…
Leakage errors are unwanted transfer of population outside of a defined computational subspace and they occur in almost every platform for quantum computing. While prevalent, leakage is often overlooked when measuring and reporting the…
Gentle quantum leakage is proposed as a measure of information leakage to arbitrary eavesdroppers that aim to avoid detection. Gentle (also sometimes referred to as weak or non-demolition) measurements are used to encode the desire of the…
We introduce a new perspective into the field of quantitative information flow (QIF) analysis that invites the community to bound the leakage, reported by QIF quantifiers, by a range consistent with the size of a program's secret input…
In this thesis we consider the problem of information hiding in the scenarios of interactive systems, statistical disclosure control, and refinement of specifications. We apply quantitative approaches to information flow in the first two…
This paper presents a scalable, practical approach to quantifying information leaks in software; these errors are often overlooked and downplayed, but can seriously compromise security mechanisms such as address space layout randomisation…
This thesis addresses the foundational aspects of formal methods for applications in security and in particular in anonymity. More concretely, we develop frameworks for the specification of anonymity properties and propose algorithms for…
Information flow analysis is a powerful technique for reasoning about the sensitive information exposed by a program during its execution. While past work has proposed information theoretic metrics (e.g., Shannon entropy, min-entropy,…
In the federated learning system, parameter gradients are shared among participants and the central modulator, while the original data never leave their protected source domain. However, the gradient itself might carry enough information…
A program is non-interferent if it leaks no secret information to an observable output. However, non-interference is too strict in many practical cases and quantitative information flow (QIF) has been proposed and studied in depth.…
A new measure of information leakage for quantum encoding of classical data is defined. An adversary can access a single copy of the state of a quantum system that encodes some classical data and is interested in correctly guessing a…
The enormous amount of code required to design modern hardware implementations often leads to critical vulnerabilities being overlooked. Especially vulnerabilities that compromise the confidentiality of sensitive data, such as cryptographic…
Information flow is the branch of security that studies the leakage of information due to correlation between secrets and observables. Since in general such correlation cannot be avoided completely, it is important to quantify the leakage.…
Physical implementations of cryptographic algorithms leak information, which makes them vulnerable to so-called side-channel attacks. The problem of secure computation in the presence of leakage is generally known as leakage resilience. In…
Detection and quantification of information leaks through timing side channels are important to guarantee confidentiality. Although static analysis remains the prevalent approach for detecting timing side channels, it is computationally…
We introduce a privacy measure called pointwise maximal leakage, generalizing the pre-existing notion of maximal leakage, which quantifies the amount of information leaking about a secret $X$ by disclosing a single outcome of a (randomized)…
Measuring the information leakage is critical for evaluating the practical security of cryptographic devices against side-channel analysis. Information-theoretic measures can be used (along with Fano's inequality) to derive upper bounds on…