Related papers: Competitive Equilibria in Two Sided Matching Marke…
Aligning AI systems with human values remains a fundamental challenge, but does our inability to create perfectly aligned models preclude obtaining the benefits of alignment? We study a strategic setting where a human user interacts with…
The goal of an auction is to determine commodity prices such that all participants are perfectly happy. Such a solution is called a competitive equilibrium and does not exist in general. For this reason we are interested in solutions which…
We represent an exchange economy in terms of statistical ensembles for complex networks by introducing the concept of market configuration. This is defined as a sequence of nonnegative discrete random variables $\{w_{ij}\}$ describing the…
We explore stability and fairness considerations in decentralized networked markets with bilateral contracts, building on the trading networks framework [Hatfield et al., 2013]. In our trading network game, we show that a well-defined…
This paper studies contracting in the presence of externalities with a non-contractible outsider. Multiple equilibria arise from strategic symmetry between the insider agent and the outsider. To address strategic uncertainty, the principal…
Competition between traditional platforms is known to improve user utility by aligning the platform's actions with user preferences. But to what extent is alignment exhibited in data-driven marketplaces? To study this question from a…
We study a networked economic system composed of $n$ producers supplying a single homogeneous good to a number of geographically separated markets and of a centralized authority, called the market maker. Producers compete \`a la Cournot, by…
The paper develops a decentralized resource allocation mechanism for allocating divisible goods with capacity constraints to non-price-taking agents with general concave utilities. The proposed mechanism is always budget balanced,…
We study a model of auction design where a seller is selling a set of objects to a set of agents who can be assigned no more than one object. Each agent's preference over (object, payment) pair need not be quasilinear. If the domain…
Mechanisms with money are commonly designed under the assumption that agents are quasi-linear, meaning they have linear disutility for spending money. We study the implications when agents with non-linear (specifically, convex) disutility…
Assignment markets involve matching with transfers, as in labor markets and housing markets. We consider a two-sided assignment market with agent types and stochastic structure similar to models used in empirical studies, and characterize…
This paper presented insights into the implementation of transactive multi-agent systems over flow networks where local resources are decentralized. Agents have local resource demand and supply, and are interconnected through a flow network…
We consider a variant of Cournot competition, where multiple firms allocate the same amount of resource across multiple markets. We prove that the game has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE), which is symmetric and is…
In various markets where sellers compete in price, price oscillations are observed rather than convergence to equilibrium. Such fluctuations have been empirically observed in the retail market for gasoline, in airline pricing and in the…
We consider a double-auction mechanism, which was recently proposed in the context of rate allocation in mobile data-offloading markets. Network operators (users) derive benefit from offloading their traffic to third party WiFi or femtocell…
Results from the communication complexity literature have demonstrated that stable matching requires communication: one cannot find or verify a stable match without having access to essentially all of the ordinal preference information held…
Computing market equilibria is a problem of both theoretical and applied interest. Much research to date focuses on the case of static Fisher markets with full information on buyers' utility functions and item supplies. Motivated by…
We model a procurement scenario in which two \textit{imperfect} bidders act simultaneously on behalf of a single buyer, a configuration common in display advertising and referred to as \textit{side-by-side bidding} but largely unexplored in…
We introduce a system of kinetic equations describing an exchange market consisting of two populations of agents (dealers and speculators) expressing the same preferences for two goods, but applying different strategies in their exchanges.…
Two-sided matchings are an important theoretical tool used to model markets and social interactions. In many real life problems the utility of an agent is influenced not only by their own choices, but also by the choices that other agents…