Related papers: Abstract Certification of Global Non-Interference …
This paper presents the first machine-checked proof of noninterference for a language with gradual information-flow control, thereby establishing a rock solid foundation for secure programming languages that give programmers the choice…
In this paper we provide a survey on the framework of abstract non-interference. In particular, we describe a general formalization of abstract non-interference by means of three dimensions (observation, protection and semantics) that can…
Noninterference is a popular semantic security condition because it offers strong end-to-end guarantees, it is inherently compositional, and it can be enforced using a simple security type system. Unfortunately, it is too restrictive for…
Information flow type systems enforce the security property of noninterference by detecting unauthorized data flows at compile-time. However, they require precise type annotations, making them difficult to use in practice as much of the…
Protecting confidential data from leaking is a critical challenge in computer systems, particularly given the growing number of observers on the internet. Therefore, limiting information flow using robust security policies becomes…
Noninterference guarantees that an attacker cannot infer secrets by interacting with a program. Information flow control (IFC) type systems assert noninterference by tracking the level of information learned (pc) and disallowing…
SAFE is a clean-slate design for a highly secure computer system, with pervasive mechanisms for tracking and limiting information flows. At the lowest level, the SAFE hardware supports fine-grained programmable tags, with efficient and…
We propose a new sheaf semantics for secure information flow over a space of abstract behaviors, based on synthetic domain theory: security classes are open/closed partitions, types are sheaves, and redaction of sensitive information…
Quantum cryptography has been extensively studied in the last twenty years, but information-flow security of quantum computing and communication systems has been almost untouched in the previous research. Duo to the essential difference…
Noninterference provides a control over information flow in a system for ensuring confidentiality and integrity properties. In the literature this notion has been well studied as transitive noninterference and intransitive noninterference.…
We introduce a scalable, modular, and sound approach for automatically constructing formal security specifications for Java bytecode programs in the form of method summaries. A summary provides an abstract representation of a method's…
Information-flow security typing statically preserves confidentiality by enforcing noninterference. To address the practical need of selective and flexible declassification of confidential information, several approaches have developed a…
Rewriting logic is both a flexible semantic framework within which widely different concurrent systems can be naturally specified and a logical framework in which widely different logics can be specified. Maude programs are exactly rewrite…
Rewriting logic is a natural and expressive framework for the specification of concurrent systems and logics. The Maude specification language provides an implementation of this formalism that allows executing, verifying, and analyzing the…
Information flow control type systems statically restrict the propagation of sensitive data to ensure end-to-end confidentiality. The property to be shown is noninterference, asserting that an attacker cannot infer any secrets from made…
Information-flow security type systems ensure confidentiality by enforcing noninterference: a program cannot leak private data to public channels. However, in practice, programs need to selectively declassify information about private data.…
Languages with gradual information-flow control combine static and dynamic techniques to prevent security leaks. Gradual languages should satisfy the gradual guarantee: programs that only differ in the precision of their type annotations…
Constant-time programming is a countermeasure to prevent cache based attacks where programs should not perform memory accesses that depend on secrets. In some cases this policy can be safely relaxed if one can prove that the program does…
Noninterference offers a rigorous end-to-end guarantee for secure propagation of information. However, real-world systems almost always involve security requirements that change during program execution, making noninterference inapplicable.…
Type systems designed for information-flow control commonly use a program-counter label to track the sensitivity of the context and rule out data leakage arising from effectful computation in a sensitive context. Currently, type-system…