Related papers: Attack--Defense Trees and Two-Player Binary Zero-S…
Zero-determinant strategies are a class of strategies in repeated games which unilaterally control payoffs. Zero-determinant strategies have attracted much attention in studies of social dilemma, particularly in the context of evolution of…
Deception is a crucial tool in the cyberdefence repertoire, enabling defenders to leverage their informational advantage to reduce the likelihood of successful attacks. One way deception can be employed is through obscuring, or masking,…
Designers of autonomous agents, whether in physical or virtual environments, need to express nondeterminisim, failure, and parallelism in behaviors, as well as accounting for synchronous coordination between agents. Behavior Trees are a…
Stealthy attacks are a major cyber-security threat. In practice, both attackers and defenders have resource constraints that could limit their capabilities. Hence, to develop robust defense strategies, a promising approach is to utilize…
In this paper, we present a proof theory for attack trees. Attack trees are a well established and useful model for the construction of attacks on systems since they allow a stepwise exploration of high level attacks in application…
Zero-sum games have long guided artificial intelligence research, since they possess both a rich strategy space of best-responses and a clear evaluation metric. What's more, competition is a vital mechanism in many real-world multi-agent…
This paper studies a stochastic game theoretic approach to security and intrusion detection in communication and computer networks. Specifically, an Attacker and a Defender take part in a two-player game over a network of nodes whose…
Attack-defense trees (ADTs) are a prominent graphical threat modeling method that is highly recommended for analyzing and communicating security-related information. Despite this, existing empirical studies of attack trees have established…
Repeated games have provided an explanation how mutual cooperation can be achieved even if defection is more favorable in a one-shot game in prisoner's dilemma situation. Recently found zero-determinant strategies have substantially been…
This paper studies a system security problem in the context of observability based on a two-person noncooperative infinitely repeated game. Both the attacker and the defender have means to modify the dimension of the unobservable subspace,…
Two-player games have had a long and fruitful history of applications stretching across the social, biological, and physical sciences. Most applications of two-player games assume synchronous decisions or moves even when the games are…
The increasingly pervasive connectivity of today's information systems brings up new challenges to security. Traditional security has accomplished a long way toward protecting well-defined goals such as confidentiality, integrity,…
We provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first computational study of extensive-form adversarial team games. These games are sequential, zero-sum games in which a team of players, sharing the same utility function, faces an adversary.…
Despite the many recent practical and theoretical breakthroughs in computational game theory, equilibrium finding in extensive-form team games remains a significant challenge. While NP-hard in the worst case, there are provably efficient…
Context and Motivation Attack-Defense Trees (ADTs) are a graphical notation used to model and assess security requirements. ADTs are widely popular, as they can facilitate communication between different stakeholders involved in system…
A checkers-like model game with a simplified set of rules is studied through extensive simulations of agents with different expertise and strategies. The introduction of complementary strategies, in a quite general way, provides a tool to…
Our objective in this paper is to develop a machinery that makes a given organizational strategic plan resilient to the actions of competitor agents (adverse environmental actions). We assume that we are given a goal tree representing…
Finite games in normal form and their mixed extensions are a corner stone of noncooperative game theory. Often generic finite games and their mixed extensions are considered. But the properties which one expects in generic games and the…
The observation that every two-person adversarial game is an affine transformation of a zero-sum game is traceable to Luce & Raiffa (1957) and made explicit in Aumann (1987). Recent work of (ADP) Adler et al. (2009), and of Raimondo (2023)…
We show that several decision problems originating from max-plus or tropical convexity are equivalent to zero-sum two player game problems. In particular, we set up an equivalence between the external representation of tropical convex sets…