Related papers: When Knowing Early Matters: Gossip, Percolation an…
In non-truthful auctions, agents' utility for a strategy depends on the strategies of the opponents and also the prior distribution over their private types; the set of Bayes Nash equilibria generally has an intricate dependence on the…
The process by which new ideas, innovations, and behaviors spread through a large social network can be thought of as a networked interaction game: Each agent obtains information from certain number of agents in his friendship neighborhood,…
Recently Bramoulle and Kranton presented a model for the provision of public goods over a network and showed the existence of a class of Nash equilibria called specialized equilibria wherein some agents exert maximum effort while other…
We consider information dissemination over a network of gossiping agents (nodes). In this model, a source keeps the most up-to-date information about a time-varying binary state of the world, and $n$ receiver nodes want to follow the…
This paper introduces a model of self-organization between communication and topology in social networks, with a feedback between different communication habits and the topology. To study this feedback, we let agents communicate to build a…
In this paper, we introduce a preliminary model for interactions in the data market. Recent research has shown ways in which a data aggregator can design mechanisms for users to ensure the quality of data, even in situations where the users…
A sender communicates private information about a hidden state to a receiver who seeks to match his action to that state. The sender strives to appear informed at the receiver's expense. I characterize informative equilibria under a broad…
Social-media platforms are one of the most prevalent communication media today. In such systems, a large amount of content is generated and available to the platform. However, not all content can be transmitted to every possible user at all…
Game-theoretic analyses of distributed and peer-to-peer systems typically use the Nash equilibrium solution concept, but this explicitly excludes the possibility of strategic behavior involving more than one agent. We examine the effects of…
We study the optimal transmission and scheduling policy for a transmitter (source) communicating with two gossiping receivers aiming at tracking the source's status over time using the age of information (AoI) metric. Gossiping enables…
This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between an oblivious receiver and a sender with different amounts of information. Even though it may seem that having additional information about the state of the game is always…
Examining the behavior of multi-agent systems is vitally important to many emerging distributed applications - game theory has emerged as a powerful tool set in which to do so. The main approach of game-theoretic techniques is to model…
The gossip problem, in which information (known as secrets) must be shared among a certain number of agents using the minimum number of calls, is of interest in the conception of communication networks and protocols. We extend the gossip…
We propose Nash Neural Networks ($N^3$) as a new type of Physics Informed Neural Network that is able to infer the underlying utility from observations of how rational individuals behave in a differential game with a Nash equilibrium. We…
We address Nash equilibrium problems in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, while its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all agents. We characterize…
In this paper, we investigate the seeking of Nash equilibrium (NE) in a non-cooperative quadratic game where all agents exchange their delayed strategy information with their neighbors. To extend best-response algorithms to the delayed…
In this work, we consider a population composed of a continuum of agents that seek to maximize a payoff function by moving on a network. The nodes in the network may represent physical locations or abstract choices. The population is…
We study how long-lived, rational agents learn in a social network. In every period, after observing the past actions of his neighbors, each agent receives a private signal, and chooses an action whose payoff depends only on the state.…
We consider a communication system where a group of users, interconnected in a bidirectional gossip network, wishes to follow a time-varying source, e.g., updates on an event, in real-time. The users wish to maintain their expected version…
In this paper, we present a game-theoretic model describing voluntary social distancing during the spread of an epidemic. The payoffs of the agents depend on the social distancing they practice and on the probability of getting infected. We…