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Related papers: Bucklin Voting is Broadly Resistant to Control

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Electoral control models ways of changing the outcome of an election via such actions as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. To protect elections from such control attempts, computational complexity has been…

Computational Complexity · Computer Science 2015-03-19 Gábor Erdélyi , Michael Fellows , Jörg Rothe , Lena Schend

We study the control complexity of fallback voting. Like manipulation and bribery, electoral control describes ways of changing the outcome of an election; unlike manipulation or bribery attempts, control actions---such as…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2010-04-21 Gábor Erdélyi , Lena Piras , Jörg Rothe

Walsh [Wal10, Wal09], Davies et al. [DKNW10, DKNW11], and Narodytska et al. [NWX11] studied various voting systems empirically and showed that they can often be manipulated effectively, despite their manipulation problems being NP-hard.…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2015-03-20 Joerg Rothe , Lena Schend

A central theme in computational social choice is to study the extent to which voting systems computationally resist manipulative attacks seeking to influence the outcome of elections, such as manipulation (i.e., strategic voting), control,…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2013-07-30 Piotr Faliszewski , Yannick Reisch , Jörg Rothe , Lena Schend

Approval-like voting rules, such as Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval voting (SP-AV), the Bucklin rule (an adaptive variant of $k$-Approval voting), and the Fallback rule (an adaptive variant of SP-AV) have many desirable…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2015-01-05 Ildikó Schlotter , Piotr Faliszewski , Edith Elkind

Electoral control refers to attempts by an election's organizer ("the chair") to influence the outcome by adding/deleting/partitioning voters or candidates. The groundbreaking work of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] on (constructive)…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2008-09-26 Edith Hemaspaandra , Lane A. Hemaspaandra , Joerg Rothe

We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an election chair to alter the structure of an election in order to change the outcome. We show…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2012-06-27 Curtis Menton

We study sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV), a system proposed by Brams and Sanver [Electoral Studies, 25(2):287-305, 2006], and here adjusted so as to coerce admissibility of the votes (rather than excluding…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2009-06-12 Gabor Erdelyi , Markus Nowak , Joerg Rothe

We study the parameterized control complexity of fallback voting, a voting system that combines preference-based with approval voting. Electoral control is one of many different ways for an external agent to tamper with the outcome of an…

Computational Complexity · Computer Science 2010-04-22 Gábor Erdélyi , Michael Fellows

The Skating System, which originated from the scrutineering system in dance sport tournaments, can be formulated as a voting system: We introduce and formalize the Skating System Single (SkS, for short), a new voting system embedded into…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-12-01 Laryssa Horn , Paul Nüsken , Jörg Rothe , Tessa Seeger

Voter control problems model situations in which an external agent tries toaffect the result of an election by adding or deleting the fewest number of voters. The goal of the agent is to make a specific candidate either win…

Multiagent Systems · Computer Science 2017-01-19 Leon Kellerhals , Viatcheslav Korenwein , Philipp Zschoche , Robert Bredereck , Jiehua Chen

Integrity of elections is vital to democratic systems, but it is frequently threatened by malicious actors. The study of algorithmic complexity of the problem of manipulating election outcomes by changing its structural features is known as…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2020-07-21 Andrew Estornell , Sanmay Das , Edith Elkind , Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

Election control considers the problem of an adversary who attempts to tamper with a voting process, in order to either ensure that their favored candidate wins (constructive control) or another candidate loses (destructive control). As…

Multiagent Systems · Computer Science 2017-11-27 Bryan Wilder , Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

Constructive election control considers the problem of an adversary who seeks to sway the outcome of an electoral process in order to ensure that their favored candidate wins. We consider the computational problem of constructive election…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2019-12-02 Jasper Lu , David Kai Zhang , Zinovi Rabinovich , Svetlana Obraztsova , Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

Voter control problems model situations such as an external agent trying to affect the result of an election by adding voters, for example by convincing some voters to vote who would otherwise not attend the election. Traditionally, voters…

Multiagent Systems · Computer Science 2014-06-27 Laurent Bulteau , Jiehua Chen , Piotr Faliszewski , Rolf Niedermeier , Nimrod Talmon

Candidate control of elections is the study of how adding or removing candidates can affect the outcome. However, the traditional study of the complexity of candidate control is in the model in which all candidates and votes are known up…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2016-06-20 Edith Hemaspaandra , Lane A. Hemaspaandra , Joerg Rothe

We survey the design of elections that are resilient to attempted interference by third parties. For example, suppose votes have been cast in an election between two candidates, and then each vote is randomly changed with a small…

Probability · Mathematics 2021-07-13 Steven Heilman

We investigate the complexity of several manipulation and control problems under numerous prevalent approval-based multiwinner voting rules. Particularly, the rules we study include approval voting (AV), satisfaction approval voting (SAV),…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-09-06 Yongjie Yang

The integrity of elections is central to democratic systems. However, a myriad of malicious actors aspire to influence election outcomes for financial or political benefit. A common means to such ends is by manipulating perceptions of the…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2022-06-22 Junlin Wu , Andrew Estornell , Lecheng Kong , Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

Electoral control types are ways of trying to change the outcome of elections by altering aspects of their composition and structure [BTT92]. We say two compatible (i.e., having the same input types) control types that are about the same…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-11-12 Benjamin Carleton , Michael C. Chavrimootoo , Lane A. Hemaspaandra , David E. Narváez , Conor Taliancich , Henry B. Welles
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