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In Path Set Packing, the input is an undirected graph $G$, a collection $\calp$ of simple paths in $G$, and a positive integer $k$. The problem is to decide whether there exist $k$ edge-disjoint paths in $\calp$. We study the parameterized…
In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters express approval preferences over a set of candidates, and the goal is to return a winning committee. This model captures a broad range of subset selection problems under preferences. Prior work…
In representative democracies, the election of new representatives in regular election cycles is meant to prevent corruption and other misbehavior by elected officials and to keep them accountable in service of the ``will of the people."…
Observing electronic voting from an international point of view gives some perspective about its genesis and evolution. An analysis of the voting process through its cultural, ontological, legal and political dimensions explains the…
We consider a model where a subset of candidates must be selected based on voter preferences, subject to general constraints that specify which subsets are feasible. This model generalizes committee elections with diversity constraints,…
In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences…
We propose a simple method for combining together voting rules that performs a run-off between the different winners of each voting rule. We prove that this combinator has several good properties. For instance, even if just one of the base…
Considering voting rules based on evaluation inputs rather than preference rankings modifies the paradigm of probabilistic studies of voting procedures. This article proposes several simulation models for generating evaluation-based voting…
We study the complexity of deciding whether there is a tie in a given approval-based multiwinner election, as well as the complexity of counting tied winning committees. We consider a family of Thiele rules, their greedy variants,…
Many applications, such as content moderation and recommendation, require reviewing and scoring a large number of alternatives. Doing so robustly is however very challenging. Indeed, voters' inputs are inevitably sparse: most alternatives…
"Control" studies attempts to set the outcome of elections through the addition, deletion, or partition of voters or candidates. The set of benchmark control types was largely set in the seminal 1992 paper by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick…
Electing a single committee of a small size is a classical and well-understood voting situation. Being interested in a sequence of committees, we introduce and study two time-dependent multistage models based on simple Plurality voting.…
A key problem in verification of multi-agent systems by model checking concerns the fact that the state-space of the system grows exponentially with the number of agents present. This makes practical model checking unfeasible whenever the…
Analyses of voting algorithms often overlook informational externalities shaping individual votes. For example, pre-polling information often skews voters towards candidates who may not be their top choice, but who they believe would be a…
There has been much recent work on multiwinner voting systems. However, sometimes a committee is highly structured, and if we want to vote for such a committee, our voting method should be more structured as well. We consider committees…
The voter process is a classic stochastic process that models the invasion of a mutant trait $A$ (e.g., a new opinion, belief, legend, genetic mutation, magnetic spin) in a population of agents (e.g., people, genes, particles) who share a…
Classical results in voting theory show that strategic manipulation by voters is inevitable if a voting rule simultaneously satisfy certain desirable properties. Motivated by this, we study the relevant question of how often a voting rule…
Repeated game has long been the touchstone model for agents' long-run relationships. Previous results suggest that it is particularly difficult for a repeated game player to exert an autocratic control on the payoffs since they are jointly…
We initiate the study of external manipulations in Stable Marriage by considering several manipulative actions as well as several manipulation goals. For instance, one goal is to make sure that a given pair of agents is matched in a stable…
Single-peakedness is one of the most important and well-known domain restrictions on preferences. The computational study of single-peaked electorates has largely been restricted to elections with tie-free votes, and recent work that…