Related papers: Control Complexity in Fallback Voting
The bribery problem in election has received considerable attention in the literature, upon which various algorithmic and complexity results have been obtained. It is thus natural to ask whether we can protect an election from potential…
The traditional election control problem focuses on the use of control to promote a single candidate. In parliamentary elections, however, the focus shifts: voters care no less about the overall governing coalition than the individual…
Electoral control types are ways of trying to change the outcome of elections by altering aspects of their composition and structure [BTT92]. We say two compatible (i.e., having the same input types) control types that are about the same…
News outlets, surveyors, and other organizations often conduct polls on social networks to gain insights into public opinion. Such a poll is typically started by someone on a social network who sends it to her friends. If a person…
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are…
Strategic manipulation of elections is typically studied in the context of promoting individual candidates. In parliamentary elections, however, the focus shifts: voters may care more about the overall governing coalition than the…
We survey the design of elections that are resilient to attempted interference by third parties. For example, suppose votes have been cast in an election between two candidates, and then each vote is randomly changed with a small…
We study the problem of bribery in multiwinner elections, for the case where the voters cast approval ballots (i.e., sets of candidates they approve) and the bribery actions are limited to: adding an approval to a vote, deleting an approval…
It is important to understand how the outcome of an election can be modified by an agent with control over the structure of the election. Electoral control has been studied for many election systems, but for all studied systems the winner…
The successive and the amendment procedures have been widely employed in parliamentary and legislative decision making and have undergone extensive study in the literature from various perspectives. However, investigating them through the…
Scoring systems are an extremely important class of election systems. We study the complexity of manipulation, constructive control by deleting voters (CCDV), and bribery for scoring systems. For manipulation, we show that for all scoring…
Bribery in an election is one of the well-studied control problems in computational social choice. In this paper, we propose and study the safe bribery problem. Here the goal of the briber is to ask the bribed voters to vote in such a way…
We study the complexity of the destructive bribery problem---an external agent tries to prevent a disliked candidate from winning by bribery actions---in voting over combinatorial domains, where the set of candidates is the Cartesian…
Successive elimination of candidates is often a route to making manipulation intractable to compute. We prove that eliminating candidates does not necessarily increase the computational complexity of manipulation. However, for many voting…
In an election, we are given a set of voters, each having a preference list over a set of candidates, that are distributed on a social network. We consider a scenario where voters may change their preference lists as a consequence of the…
Voting is a simple mechanism to aggregate the preferences of agents. Many voting rules have been shown to be NP-hard to manipulate. However, a number of recent theoretical results suggest that this complexity may only be in the worst-case…
We study the complexity of constructive bribery in the context of structured multiwinner approval elections. Given such an election, we ask whether a certain candidate can join the winning committee by adding, deleting, or swapping…
We study the election control problem with multi-votes, where each voter can present a single vote according different views (or layers, we use "layer" to represent "view"). For example, according to the attributes of candidates, such as:…
We consider the problem of manipulating elections by cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulator can replace each candidate c by several clones, i.e., new candidates that are so similar to c that each voter simply replaces c in his vote…
The Coalitional Manipulation (CM) problem has been studied extensively in the literature for many voting rules. The CM problem, however, has been studied only in the complete information setting, that is, when the manipulators know the…