Related papers: How to prevent type-flaw and multi-protocol attack…
Semi-supervised learning (SSL) enables prediction with limited labels, but high-stakes tabular applications (medical, credit, recidivism) require statistical fairness guarantees. We identify a structural conflict in tabular fair SSL through…
Methods of quantum mechanics promise information-theoretic security for various protocols in cryptography. However, impossibility of some cryptographic applications such as standard bit commitment, oblivious transfer, multiparty secure…
The XOR Arbiter PUF was introduced as a strong PUF in 2007 and was broken in 2015 by a Machine Learning (ML) attack, which allows the underlying Arbiter PUFs to be modeled individually by exploiting reliability information of the measured…
We propose a quantum-enhanced protocol to authenticate classical messages, with improved security with respect to the classical scheme introduced by Brassard in 1983. In that protocol, the shared key is the seed of a pseudo-random generator…
This paper considers the problem of securing a linear network coding system against an adversary that is both an eavesdropper and a jammer. The network is assumed to transport n packets from source to each receiver, and the adversary is…
Quantum digital signatures ensure unforgeable message authenticity and integrity using quantum principles, offering unconditional security against both classical and quantum attacks. They are crucial for secure communication in high-stakes…
Recently, position-based quantum cryptography has been claimed to be unconditionally secure. In contrary, here we show that the existing proposals for position-based quantum cryptography are, in fact, insecure if entanglement is shared…
The prospective emergence of large-scale quantum computers capable of executing Shor's algorithm at cryptographically relevant scale would render widely deployed public-key cryptography computationally insecure. Under this threat model,…
Quantum-based cryptographic protocols are often said to enjoy security guaranteed by the fundamental laws of physics. However, even carefully designed quantum-based cryptographic schemes may be susceptible to subtle attacks that are outside…
We present Serberus, the first comprehensive mitigation for hardening constant-time (CT) code against Spectre attacks (involving the PHT, BTB, RSB, STL and/or PSF speculation primitives) on existing hardware. Serberus is based on three…
We address the problem of attack detection and isolation for a class of discrete-time nonlinear systems under (potentially unbounded) sensor attacks and measurement noise. We consider the case when a subset of sensors is subject to additive…
In programming, protocols are everywhere. Protocols describe the pattern of interaction (or communication) between software systems, for example, between a user-space program and the kernel or between a local application and an online…
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are promising security primitives for resource-constrained network nodes. The XOR Arbiter PUF (XOR PUF or XPUF) is an intensively studied PUF invented to improve the security of the Arbiter PUF, probably…
Modern processors include high-performance cryptographic functionalities such as Intel's AES-NI and ARM's Pointer Authentication that allow programs to efficiently authenticate data held by the program. Pointer Authentication is already…
We analyze the security of the authentication code against pollution attacks in network coding given by Oggier and Fathi and show one way to remove one very strong condition they required. Actually, we find a way to attack their…
Consider designing a distributed coin-tossing protocol for n processors such that the probability of heads is X0 in [0,1], and an adversary can reset one processor to change the distribution of the final outcome. For X0=1/2, in the…
The Algebraic Eraser (AE) is a public key protocol for sharing information over an insecure channel using commutative and noncommutative groups; a concrete realization is given by Colored Burau Key Agreement Protocol (CBKAP). In this paper,…
Textual backdoor attacks present a substantial security risk to Large Language Models (LLM). It embeds carefully chosen triggers into a victim model at the training stage, and makes the model erroneously predict inputs containing the same…
Existing program verifiers can prove advanced properties about security protocol implementations, but are difficult to scale to large codebases because of the manual effort required. We develop a novel methodology called *Diodon* that…
In a zero-trust fabless paradigm, designers are increasingly concerned about hardware-based attacks on the semiconductor supply chain. Logic locking is a design-for-trust method that adds extra key-controlled gates in the circuits to…