Related papers: Intuitionism and the liar paradox
In this paper we analyse logic of false belief in intuitionistic setting. This logic, studied in its classical version by Steinsvold, Fan, Gilbert and Venturi, describes the following situation: a formula F is not satisfied in a given…
Debates concerning philosophical grounds for the validity of classical and intuitionistic logics often have the very nature of logical proofs as one of the main points of controversy. The intuitionist advocates for a strict notion of…
We learn mathematics subjectively and must apply it objectively. But sometimes, we apply it subjectively by using wrong intuitions which may be elusive to our eyes. The aim of this note is to disclose the secretes of two kinds of these…
The liar paradox is widely seen as not a serious problem. I try to explain why this view is mistaken.
Moores Paradox is a test case for any formal theory of belief. In Knowledge and Belief, Hintikka developed a multimodal logic for statements that express sentences containing the epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. His account…
We explore the theory of illfounded and cyclic proofs for the propositional modal $\mu$-calculus. A fine analysis of provability for classical and intuitionistic modal logic provides a novel bridge between finitary, cyclic and illfounded…
This paper revisits Buridan's Bridge paradox (Sophismata, chapter 8, Sophism 17), itself close kin to the Liar paradox, a version of which also appears in Bradwardine's Insolubilia. Prompted by the occurrence of the paradox in Cervantes's…
Established frameworks to understand problems with reproducibility in science begin with the relationship between our understanding of the prior probability of a claim and the statistical certainty that should be demanded of it, and explore…
Recently, the educational initiative TED-Ed has published a popular brain teaser coined the 'frog riddle', which illustrates non-intuitive implications of conditional probabilities. In its intended form, the frog riddle is a reformulation…
The fundamental proposal in this article is that logical formulas of the form (f <-> ~f) are not contradictions, and that formulas of the form (t <-> t) are not tautologies. Such formulas, wherever they appear in mathematics, are instead…
This paper presents a plausible reasoning system to illustrate some broad issues in knowledge representation: dualities between different reasoning forms, the difficulty of unifying complementary reasoning styles, and the approximate nature…
Agents' judgment depends on perception and previous knowledge. Assuming that previous knowledge depends on perception, we can say that judgment depends on perception. So, if judgment depends on perception, can agents judge that they have…
Illusions are entertaining, but they are also a useful diagnostic tool in cognitive science, philosophy, and neuroscience. A typical illusion shows a gap between how something "really is" and how something "appears to be", and this gap…
This paper presents a formal theory which describes propositional binary logic as a semantically closed formal language, and allows for syntactically and semantically well-formed formulae, formal proofs (demonstrability in Hilbertian…
The apparently trifling unexpected hanging paradox has generated an enormous philosophical literature. We introduce the mathematician to this literature, paying special attention to aspects that involve nontrivial mathematics. This xxx…
Constructivists (and intuitionists in general) asked what kind of mental construction is needed to convince ourselves (and others) that some mathematical statement is true. This question has a much more practical (and even cynical)…
The investigations on higher-order type theories and on the related notion of parametric polymorphism constitute the technical counterpart of the old foundational problem of the circularity (or impredicativity) of second and higher order…
There is knowledge. There is belief. And there is tacit agreement.' 'We may talk about objects. We may talk about attributes of the objects. Or we may talk both about objects and their attributes.' This work inspects tacit agreements on…
We argue that the notion of epistemic \emph{possible worlds} in constructivism (intuitionism) is not as the same as it is in classic view, and there are possibilities, called non-predetermined worlds, which are ignored in (classic)…
What if the paradoxical nature of quantum theory could find its source in some undecidability analog to that of G\"odel's incompleteness theorem ? This essay aims at arguing for such G\"odelian hunch via two case studies. Firstly, using a…