Related papers: Impact of critical mass on the evolution of cooper…
Many real systems are strongly characterized by collective cooperative phenomena whose existence and properties still need a satisfactory explanation. Coherently with their collective nature, they call for new and more accurate descriptions…
In dyadic models of indirect reciprocity, the receivers' history of giving has a significant impact on the donor's decision. When the interaction involves more than two agents things become more complicated, and in large groups cooperation…
People's cooperation in adopting protective measures is effective in epidemic control and creates herd immunity as a public good. Similarly, the presence of an epidemic is a driving factor for the formation and improvement of cooperation.…
The promise of punishment and reward in promoting public cooperation is debatable. While punishment is traditionally considered more successful than reward, the fact that the cost of punishment frequently fails to offset gains from enhanced…
Leaving the joint enterprise when defection is unveiled is always a viable option to avoid being exploited. Although loner strategy helps the population not to be trapped into the tragedy of the commons state, it could offer only a modest…
Understanding and resolving cooperation dilemmas are key challenges in evolutionary game theory, which have revealed several mechanisms to address them. This paper investigates the comprehensive influence of multiple reputation-related…
The Matthew effect describes the phenomenon where the rich tend to get richer. Such a success-driven mechanism has been studied in spatial public goods games in an inter-group way, where each individual's social power is enhanced across all…
The evolution of cooperation is a central enigma in evolutionary game theory. Traditionally, the combination of pairwise networks and repeated Public Goods Games with a single state fails to adequately describe realistic group interaction…
The view that altruistic punishment plays an important role in supporting public cooperation among human beings and other species has been widely accepted by the public. However, the positive role of altruistic punishment in enhancing…
We study the effects of mobility on the evolution of cooperation among mobile players, which imitate collective motion of biological flocks and interact with neighbors within a prescribed radius $R$. Adopting the prisoner's dilemma game and…
How cooperation emerges in human societies is still a puzzle. Evolutionary game theory has been the standard framework to address this issue. In most models, every individual plays with all others, and then reproduce and die according to…
We study a class of non-cooperative aggregative games -- denoted as \emph{social purpose games} -- in which the payoffs depend separately on a player's own strategy (individual benefits) and on a function of the strategy profile which is…
An improved mathematical model of social group competition is proposed. The utility obtained by a member of a certain group from each other member is assumed to be group size-dependent. Obtained results are close to available census data.…
Commonly, the strategy revision phase in evolutionary games relies on payoff comparison. Namely, agents compare their payoff with the opponent, assessing whether changing strategy can be potentially convenient. Even tiny payoff differences…
Exploiting others is beneficial individually but it could also be detrimental globally. The reverse is also true: a higher cooperation level may change the environment in a way that is beneficial for all competitors. To explore the possible…
When can cooperation arise from self-interested decisions in public goods games? And how can we help agents to act cooperatively? We examine these classical questions in a pivotal participation game, a variant of public good games, where…
Public goods game serves as a valuable paradigm for studying the challenges of collective cooperation in human and natural societies. Peer punishment is often considered as an effective incentive for promoting cooperation in such contexts.…
A greedy personality is usually accompanied by arrogance and confidence. This work investigates the cooperation success condition in the context of biased payoff allocation and self-confidence. The first component allows the organizer in a…
In a social dilemma game group members are allowed to decide if they contribute to the joint venture or not. As a consequence, defectors, who do not invest but only enjoy the mutual benefit, prevail and the system evolves onto the tragedy…
In previous studies of spatial public goods game, each player is able to establish a group. However, in real life, some players cannot successfully organize groups for various reasons. In this paper, we propose a mechanism of…