Related papers: Truthful Fair Division
Cake-cutting algorithms, which aim to fairly allocate a continuous resource based on individual agent preferences, have seen significant progress over the past two decades. Much of the research has concentrated on fairness, with…
Cake cutting is one of the most fundamental settings in fair division and mechanism design without money. In this paper, we consider different levels of three fundamental goals in cake cutting: fairness, Pareto optimality, and…
Fair division is a significant, long-standing problem and is closely related to social and economic justice. The conventional division methods such as cut-and-choose are hardly applicable to realworld problems because of their complexity…
Cake cutting is a classic model for studying fair division of a heterogeneous, divisible resource among agents with individual preferences. Addressing cake division under a typical requirement that each agent must receive a connected piece…
In many developing countries, the total electricity demand is larger than the limited generation capacity of power stations. Many countries adopt the common practice of routine load shedding - disconnecting entire regions from the power…
Behavioural economists have shown that people are often averse to inequality and will make choices to avoid unequal outcomes. In this paper, we consider how to allocate indivisible goods fairly so as to minimize inequality. We consider how…
In this paper, we study the problem of splitting fairly bundles of items. We show that given $n$ bundles with $m$ kinds of items in them, it is possible to distribute the value of each kind of item fairly among $r$ persons by breaking apart…
We characterize the communication complexity of truthful mechanisms. Our departure point is the well known taxation principle. The taxation principle asserts that every truthful mechanism can be interpreted as follows: every player is…
We study the discrete variation of the classical cake-cutting problem where n players divide a 1-dimensional cake with exactly (n-1) cuts, replacing the continuous, infinitely divisible "cake" with a necklace of discrete, indivisible…
We consider allocating indivisible goods with provable fairness guarantees that are satisfied regardless of which bundle of items each agent receives. Symmetrical allocations of this type are known to exist for divisible resources, such as…
We propose an online form of the cake cutting problem. This models situations where players arrive and depart during the process of dividing a resource. We show that well known fair division procedures like cut-and-choose and the…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents in an online setting, where goods arrive sequentially and must be allocated irrevocably. Focusing on the popular fairness notions of envy-freeness, proportionality, and…
We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains both positive and negative values. We show that the class of…
We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem,…
We study classic cake-cutting problems, but in discrete models rather than using infinite-precision real values, specifically, focusing on their communication complexity. Using general discrete simulations of classical infinite-precision…
In Fair AI literature, the practice of maliciously creating unfair models that nevertheless satisfy fairness constraints is known as "cherry-picking". A cherry-picking model is a model that makes mistakes on purpose, selecting bad…
A rapidly growing literature on lying in behavioral economics and psychology shows that individuals often do not lie even when lying maximizes their utility. In this work, we attempt to incorporate these findings into the theory of…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods with variable groups. In this model, the goal is to partition the agents into groups of given sizes and allocate the goods to the groups in a fair manner. We show that for any number of…
In markets such as digital advertising auctions, bidders want to maximize value rather than payoff. This is different to the utility functions typically assumed in auction theory and leads to different strategies and outcomes. We refer to…
A set of objects is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. If we consider the objects as indivisible, many instances of the decision problem: ``Is there a fair division of the objects…