Related papers: Unwinding Conditional Noninterference
Non-interference, in transitive or intransitive form, is defined here over unbounded (Place/Transition) Petri nets. The definitions are adaptations of similar, well-accepted definitions introduced earlier in the framework of labelled…
The paper studies dynamic information flow security policies in an automaton-based model. Two semantic interpretations of such policies are developed, both of which generalize the notion of TA-security [van der Meyden ESORICS 2007] for…
Noninterference offers a rigorous end-to-end guarantee for secure propagation of information. However, real-world systems almost always involve security requirements that change during program execution, making noninterference inapplicable.…
Noninterference is a popular semantic security condition because it offers strong end-to-end guarantees, it is inherently compositional, and it can be enforced using a simple security type system. Unfortunately, it is too restrictive for…
Information flow control type systems statically restrict the propagation of sensitive data to ensure end-to-end confidentiality. The property to be shown is noninterference, asserting that an attacker cannot infer any secrets from made…
We develop a theory for state-based noninterference in a setting where different security policies---we call them local policies---apply in different parts of a given system. Our theory comprises appropriate security definitions,…
Noninterference guarantees that an attacker cannot infer secrets by interacting with a program. Information flow control (IFC) type systems assert noninterference by tracking the level of information learned (pc) and disallowing…
Protecting confidential data from leaking is a critical challenge in computer systems, particularly given the growing number of observers on the internet. Therefore, limiting information flow using robust security policies becomes…
We consider CCS with value passing and elaborate a notion of noninterference for the process calculi, which matches closely that of the programming language. The idea is to view channels as information carriers rather than as "events", so…
A security policy specifies a security property as the maximal information flow. A distributed system composed of interacting processes implicitly defines an intransitive security policy by repudiating direct information flow between…
Language-based information flow methods offer a principled way to enforce strong security properties, but enforcing noninterference is too inflexible for realistic applications. Security-typed languages have therefore introduced…
Quantum cryptography has been extensively studied in the last twenty years, but information-flow security of quantum computing and communication systems has been almost untouched in the previous research. Duo to the essential difference…
Information-flow security typing statically preserves confidentiality by enforcing noninterference. To address the practical need of selective and flexible declassification of confidential information, several approaches have developed a…
The paper considers several definitions of information flow security for intransitive policies from the point of view of the complexity of verifying whether a finite-state system is secure. The results are as follows. Checking (i)…
Practitioners of secure information flow often face a design challenge: what is the right semantic treatment of leaks via termination? On the one hand, the potential harm of untrusted code calls for strong progress-sensitive security. On…
Information flow type systems enforce the security property of noninterference by detecting unauthorized data flows at compile-time. However, they require precise type annotations, making them difficult to use in practice as much of the…
Information-flow security type systems ensure confidentiality by enforcing noninterference: a program cannot leak private data to public channels. However, in practice, programs need to selectively declassify information about private data.…
We propose a new sheaf semantics for secure information flow over a space of abstract behaviors, based on synthetic domain theory: security classes are open/closed partitions, types are sheaves, and redaction of sensitive information…
In this paper, we focus on the synthesis of secure timed systems which are modelled as timed automata. The security property that the system must satisfy is a non-interference property. Intuitively, non-interference ensures the absence of…
Security of information flow is commonly understood as preventing any information leakage, regardless of how grave or harmless consequences the leakage can have. In this work, we suggest that information security is not a goal in itself,…