Related papers: Mean extinction times in cyclic coevolutionary roc…
A co-evolving and adaptive Rock (R)-Paper (P)-Scissors (S) game (ARPS) in which an agent uses one of three cyclically dominating strategies is proposed and studied numerically and analytically. An agent takes adaptive actions to achieve a…
Population dynamics reflects an underlying birth-death process, where the rates associated with different events may depend on external environmental conditions and on the population density. A whole family of simple and popular…
We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant…
We study the rock-paper-scissors game in structured populations, where the invasion rates determine individual payoffs that govern the process of strategy change. The traditional version of the game is recovered if the payoffs for each…
We study the network replicator equation and characterize its fixed points on arbitrary graph structures for $2 \times 2$ symmetric games. We show a relationship between the asymptotic behavior of the network replicator and the existence of…
In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or…
Sexually reproducing populations with small number of individuals may go extinct by stochastic fluctuations in sex determination, causing all their members to become male or female in a generation. In this work we calculate the time to…
We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model where agents who make decisions using either automatic or…
The extinction of species is a core process that affects the diversity of life on Earth. One way of investigating the causes and consequences of extinctions is to build conceptual ecological models, and to use the dynamical outcomes of such…
A deterministic two-species predator-prey model with prey herd behavior is considered incorporating mutual interference and the effect of fear. We provide guidelines to the dynamical analysis of biologically feasible equilibrium points. We…
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is the defining concept of evolutionary game theory. It has a fairly unanimously accepted definition for the case of symmetric games which are played in a homogeneous population where all individuals are…
Macroevolution is considered as a problem of stochastic dynamics in a system with many competing agents. Evolutionary events (speciations and extinctions) are triggered by fitness records found by random exploration of the agents' fitness…
The authors (Cason, Friedman and Hopkins, Reviews of Economics Studies, 2014) claimed a result that the treatments (using simultaneous matching in discrete time) replicate previous results that exhibit weak or no cycles. After correct two…
The idea of evolutionarily stable state (ESS) of a population is a cornerstone of evolutionary game theory; moreover, it coincides with the game-theoretic concept of Nash equilibrium. Such a state corresponds to a strategy adopted by the…
We investigate a six-species class of May-Leonard models leading to formation two types of competing spatial domains, each one inhabited by three-species with their own internal cyclic rock-paper-scissors dynamics. We study the resulting…
Coevolving and competing species or game-theoretic strategies exhibit rich and complex dynamics for which a general theoretical framework based on finite populations is still lacking. Recently, an explicit mean-field description in the form…
We investigate the problem of the predominance and survival of "weak" species in the context of the simplest generalization of the spatial stochastic rock-paper-scissors model to four species by considering models in which one, two, or…
The survival of natural populations may be greatly affected by environmental conditions that vary in space and time. We look at a population residing in two locations (patches) coupled by migration, in which the local conditions fluctuate…
In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundance of the various strategies in the population. Here we study general games among n strategies in populations of large but finite size. We…
The stable cooperation ratio of spatial evolutionary games has been widely studied using simulations or approximate analysis methods. However, sometimes such ``stable'' cooperation ratios obtained via approximate methods might not be…