Related papers: An Approximate Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium Computa…

In this paper, we present exploitability descent, a new algorithm to compute approximate equilibria in two-player zero-sum extensive-form games with imperfect information, by direct policy optimization against worst-case opponents. We prove…

This paper examines multiplayer symmetric constant-sum games with more than two players in a competitive setting, including examples like Mahjong, Poker, and various board and video games. In contrast to two-player zero-sum games,…

We present polynomial-time algorithms as well as hardness results for equilibrium computation in atomic splittable routing games, for the case of general convex cost functions. These games model traffic in freight transportation, market…

We study two-player zero-sum concurrent stochastic games with finite state and action space played for an infinite number of steps. In every step, the two players simultaneously and independently choose an action. Given the current state…

We show that computing an equilibrium in atomic splittable congestion games with player-specific affine cost functions $l_{e,i}(x) = a_{e,i} x + b_{e,i}$ is $\mathsf{PPAD}$-complete. To prove that the problem is contained in…

We introduce Cut-and-Play, a practically-efficient algorithm for computing Nash equilibria in simultaneous non-cooperative games where players decide via nonconvex and possibly unbounded optimization problems with separable payoff…

Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the canonical solution concept of game theory, which provides an elegant tool to understand the rationalities. Though mixed strategy NE exists in any game with finite players and actions, computing NE in two- or…

We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…

We present a framework for computing approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of continuous-action games. It is a modification of the traditional double oracle algorithm, extended to multiple players and continuous action spaces. Unlike…

This paper uses value functions to characterize the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of an arbitrary, possibly infinite-horizon game. It specifies the game's extensive form as a pentaform (Streufert 2023p, arXiv:2107.10801v4), which…

We tackle the problem of learning equilibria in simulation-based games. In such games, the players' utility functions cannot be described analytically, as they are given through a black-box simulator that can be queried to obtain noisy…

We propose the Subgame Credible Nash Equilibrium (SCNE), a refinement of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) for multi-stage games. SCNE retains the internal credibility requirement of SPNE -- equilibrium behavior in every subgame --…

We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of a game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety…

We present novel techniques for neuro-symbolic concurrent stochastic games, a recently proposed modelling formalism to represent a set of probabilistic agents operating in a continuous-space environment using a combination of neural network…

We develop value iteration-based algorithms to solve in a unified manner different classes of combinatorial zero-sum games with mean-payoff type rewards. These algorithms rely on an oracle, evaluating the dynamic programming operator up to…

Imperfect-Information Extensive-Form Games (IIEFGs) is a prevalent model for real-world games involving imperfect information and sequential plays. The Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium (EFCE) has been proposed as a natural solution…

We compute equilibrium strategies in multi-stage games with continuous signal and action spaces as they are widely used in the management sciences and economics. Examples include sequential sales via auctions, multi-stage elimination…

We apply Blackwell optimality to repeated games. An equilibrium whose strategy profile is sequentially rational for all high enough discount factors simultaneously is a Blackwell (subgame-perfect, perfect public, etc.) equilibrium. The bite…

We construct subgame-perfect equilibria with mixed strategies for symmetric stochastic timing games with arbitrary strategic incentives. The strategies are qualitatively different for local first- or second-mover advantages, which we…

A major open question in algorithmic game theory is whether normal-form correlated equilibria (NFCE) can be computed efficiently in succinct games such as extensive-form games [DFF+25,6PR24,FP23,HvS08,VSF08,PR08]. Motivated by this…