Related papers: Frugal Mechanism Design via Spectral Techniques
We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving reduction from truthfully maximizing \emph{any} objective under…
Here we introduce the idea of using rational expectations, a core concept in economics and finance, as a tool to predict the optimal failure time for a wide class of weighted k-out-of-n reliability systems. We illustrate the concept by…
We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…
We consider a class of multi-stage robust covering problems, where additional information is revealed about the problem instance in each stage, but the cost of taking actions increases. The dilemma for the decision-maker is whether to wait…
We propose a mechanism design framework that incorporates both soft information, which can be freely manipulated, and semi-hard information, which entails a cost for falsification. The framework captures various contexts such as school…
Motivated by many practical applications, in this paper we study {\em budget feasible mechanisms} where the goal is to procure independent sets from matroids. More specifically, we are given a matroid $\mathcal{M}=(E,\mathcal{I})$ where…
In this work we are concerned with the design of efficient mechanisms while eliciting limited information from the agents. First, we study the performance of sampling approximations in facility location games. Our key result is to show that…
The classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism ensures incentive compatibility, i.e., that truth-telling of all agents is a dominant strategy, for a static one-shot game. However, in a dynamic environment that unfolds over time, the…
In this paper, we study efficiency in truthful auctions via a social network, where a seller can only spread the information of an auction to the buyers through the buyers' network. In single-item auctions, we show that no mechanism is…
We study the structural constraint of random scale-free networks that determines possible combinations of the degree exponent $\gamma$ and the upper cutoff $k_c$ in the thermodynamic limit. We employ the framework of graphicality…
The integration of traditional fixed-route transit (FRT) and more flexible microtransit has been touted as a means of improving mobility and access to opportunity, increasing transit ridership, and promoting environmental sustainability. To…
We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design in the interdimensional setting, where one dimension is the 'value' of the buyer, and one is a 'type' that captures some auxiliary information. One setting is the FedEx Problem, for which FGKK…
Mechanism design is now a standard tool in computer science for aligning the incentives of self-interested agents with the objectives of a system designer. There is, however, a fundamental disconnect between the traditional application…
Traditional combinatorial spectrum auctions mainly rely on fixed bidding and matching processes, which limit participants' ability to adapt their strategies and often result in suboptimal social welfare in dynamic spectrum sharing…
We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in mechanism design. The principal elicits a message from the agent and then selects a test to give the agent. The agent's true type determines the probability with which he can pass each…
In this research, we study the problem that a collector acquires items from the owner based on the item qualities the owner declares and an independent appraiser's assessments. The owner is interested in maximizing the probability that the…
We study truthful mechanisms for approximating the Maximin-Share (MMS) allocation of agents with additive valuations for indivisible goods. Algorithmically, constant factor approximations exist for the problem for any number of agents. When…
We consider the $k$-Median problem on planar graphs: given an edge-weighted planar graph $G$, a set of clients $C \subseteq V(G)$, a set of facilities $F \subseteq V(G)$, and an integer parameter $k$, the task is to find a set of at most…
A fundamental assumption in classical mechanism design is that buyers are perfect optimizers. However, in practice, buyers may be limited by their computational capabilities or a lack of information, and may not be able to perfectly…
Our work is devoted to the metric facility location problem and addresses the selfish behavior of the players. It contributes to the line of work initiated by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [EC09] on approximate mechanism design without money.…