Related papers: Bounding Rationality by Discounting Time
We study repeated games played by players with bounded computational power, where, in contrast to Abreu and Rubisntein (1988), the memory is costly. We prove a folk theorem: the limit set of equilibrium payoffs in mixed strategies, as the…
Consider a cost-sharing game with players of different contribution to the total cost: an example might be an insurance company calculating premiums for a population of mixed-risk individuals. Two natural and competing notions of fairness…
A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…
Real populations are seldom found at the Nash equilibrium strategy. The present work focuses on how population size can be a relevant evolutionary force diverting the population from its expected Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept…
We study optimal equilibria in multi-player games. An equilibrium is optimal for a player, if her payoff is maximal. A tempting approach to solving this problem is to seek optimal Nash equilibria, the standard form of equilibria where no…
As we show using the notion of equilibrium in the theory of infinite sequential games, bubbles and escalations are rational for economic and environmental agents, who believe in an infinite world. This goes against a vision of a self…
Conventional game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational. In a realistic situation, however, players are rarely perfectly rational. This bounded rationality is one of the main reasons why the predictions of Nash equilibrium in…
Stochastic games with discounted payoff, introduced by Shapley, model adversarial interactions in stochastic environments where two players try to optimize a discounted sum of rewards. In this model, long-term weights are geometrically…
We present a unifying representation of computation as a two-player game between an \emph{Algorithm} and \emph{Nature}, grounded in domain theory and game theory. The Algorithm produces progressively refined approximations within a Scott…
The following game is played on a weighted graph: Alice selects a matching $M$ and Bob selects a number $k$. Alice's payoff is the ratio of the weight of the $k$ heaviest edges of $M$ to the maximum weight of a matching of size at most $k$.…
At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents are going to play. Suppose that these theories are commonly known. Then, players will refine their first-order beliefs, and challenge their own…
Game theory is usually considered applied mathematics, but a few game-theoretic results, such as Borel determinacy, were developed by mathematicians for mathematics in a broad sense. These results usually state determinacy, i.e. the…
We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to…
A group of players which contain n sellers and n buyers bargain over the partitions of n pies. A seller(/buyer) has to reach an agreement with a buyer (/seller) on the division of a pie. The players bargain in a system like the stock…
This article presents a unified probabilistic framework that allows both rational and irrational decision making to be theoretically investigated and simulated in classical and quantum games. Rational choice theory is a basic component of…
The aim of this of this paper is to study infinite games and to prove formally some properties in this framework. As a consequence we show that the behavior (the madness) of people which leads to speculative crashes or escalation can be…
In this paper, we consider zero-sum repeated games in which the maximizer is restricted to strategies requiring no more than a limited amount of randomness. Particularly, we analyze the maxmin payoff of the maximizer in two models: the…
We consider a simple streaming game between two players Alice and Bob, which we call the mirror game. In this game, Alice and Bob take turns saying numbers belonging to the set $\{1, 2, \dots,2N\}$. A player loses if they repeat a number…
The paper is devoted to dynamic games. We consider a general enough framework, which is not limited to e.g. differential games and could accommodate both discrete and continuous time. Assuming common dynamics, we study two game families…
It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable strategies that have best responses, but no computable best responses. These results were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Prisoner's dilemma), or…