Related papers: State Information in Bayesian Games
Encoding and decoding are the two key steps in information processing. In this work we study the encoding and decoding capabilities of operational theories in the context of information-storability game, where the task is to freely choose a…
In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, while the uninformed one, the receiver, does not. The informed…
Information asymmetry in games enables players with the information advantage to manipulate others' beliefs by strategically revealing information to other players. This work considers a double-sided information asymmetry in a Bayesian…
Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and the deceivee.…
We study a model of games that combines concurrency, imperfect information and stochastic aspects. Those are finite states games in which, at each round, the two players choose, simultaneously and independently, an action. Then a successor…
We study a Bayesian coordination game where agents receive private information on the game's payoff structure. In addition, agents receive private signals on each other's private information. We show that once agents possess these different…
We introduce a "high probability" framework for repeated games with incomplete information. In our non-equilibrium setting, players aim to guarantee a certain payoff with high probability, rather than in expected value. We provide a high…
We investigate a two-player zero-sum differential game with asymmetric information on the payoff and without Isaacs condition. The dynamics is an ordinary differential equation parametrised by two controls chosen by the players. Each player…
Zero-sum asymmetric games model decision making scenarios involving two competing players who have different information about the game being played. A particular case is that of nested information, where one (informed) player has superior…
Using methods from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems we analyze the properties of bimatrix games with random payoffs in the limit where the number of pure strategies of each player tends to infinity. We analytically calculate…
The symbiotic relationship between the frameworks of classical game theory and evolutionary game theory is well-established. However, evolutionary game theorists have mostly tapped into the classical game of complete information where…
In this paper, we investigate the existence and characterization of the value for a two-player zero-sum differential game with symmetric incomplete information on a continuum of initial positions and with signal revelation. Before the game…
We study the optimal use of information in Markov games with incomplete information on one side and two states. We provide a finite-stage algorithm for calculating the limit value as the gap between stages goes to 0, and an optimal strategy…
Betting games provide a natural setting to capture how information yields strategic advantage. The Kelly criterion for betting, long a cornerstone of portfolio theory and information theory, admits an interpretation in the limit of…
This paper studies two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian games in which every player has a private type that is unknown to the other player, and the initial probability of the type of every player is publicly known. The types of players are…
We introduce two-level discounted games played by two players on a perfect-information stochastic game graph. The upper level game is a discounted game and the lower level game is an undiscounted reachability game. Two-level games model…
When a game involves many agents or when communication between agents is not possible, it is useful to resort to distributed learning where each agent acts in complete autonomy without any information on the other agents' situations.…
We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoffs, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is of low quality, equilibrium uniqueness obtains in a manner…
The paper proposes a natural measure space of zero-sum perfect information games with upper semicontinuous payoffs. Each game is specified by the game tree, and by the assignment of the active player and of the capacity to each node of the…
We prove that zero-sum Dynkin games in continuous time with partial and asymmetric information admit a value in randomised stopping times when the stopping payoffs of the players are general \cadlag measurable processes. As a by-product of…