Related papers: The Complexity of Iterated Strategy Elimination
When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s).…
We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in simple stochastic multiplayer games. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval may lead to undecidability. In…
This paper contains a reformulation of any $n$-player finite, static game into a framework of distributed, dynamical system based on agents' payoff-based deviations. The reformulation generalizes the method employed in the second part of…
Real populations are seldom found at the Nash equilibrium strategy. The present work focuses on how population size can be a relevant evolutionary force diverting the population from its expected Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept…
We investigate a variety of cut and choose games, their relationship with (generic) large cardinals, and show that they can be used to characterize a number of properties of ideals and of partial orders: certain notions of distributivity,…
We consider the complexity of finding a correlated equilibrium of an $n$-player game in a model that allows the algorithm to make queries on players' payoffs at pure strategy profiles. Randomized regret-based dynamics are known to yield an…
It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable strategies that have best responses, but no computable best responses. These results were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Prisoner's dilemma), or…
Studying strategy update rules in the framework of evolutionary game theory, one can differentiate between imitation processes and aspiration-driven dynamics. In the former case, individuals imitate the strategy of a more successful peer.…
This article deals with classes of antagonistic games with two players. A game is specified in terms of two `hostile' stochastic processes representing mutual attacks upon random times exerting casualties of random magnitudes. The game ends…
We study stochastic evolution of optional games on simple graphs. There are two strategies, A and B, whose interaction is described by a general payoff matrix. In addition there are one or several possibilities to opt out from the game by…
Video Games are boring when they are too easy, and frustrating when they are too hard. In terms of providing game experience such as enjoyment to the player by match players with different levels of ability to player ability, We assume that…
The rank of a bimatrix game is defined as the rank of the sum of the payoff matrices of the two players. The rank of a game is known to impact both the most suitable computation methods for determining a solution and the expressive power of…
We investigate the quantization of non-zero sum games. For the particular case of the Prisoners' Dilemma we show that this game ceases to pose a dilemma if quantum strategies are allowed for. We also construct a particular quantum strategy…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
This paper presents a new exponential lower bound for the two most popular deterministic variants of the strategy improvement algorithms for solving parity, mean payoff, discounted payoff and simple stochastic games. The first variant…
In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…
Something is definitely wrong. If the game has a linear winning strategy, then it is tractable. What's going on? Well, we describe a two-person game which has a definite winner, that is, a player who can force a win in a finite number of…
We give a general method for constructing a deterministic strategy of Reality from a randomized strategy in game-theoretic probability. The construction can be seen as derandomization in game-theoretic probability.
We consider a version of the ultimatum game which simultaneously combines reactive and Darwinian aspects with offers in [0,1]. By reactive aspects, we consider the effects that lead the player to change their offer given the previous…
We present a polynomial-time reduction from max-plus-average constraints to the feasibility problem for semidefinite programs. This shows that Condon's simple stochastic games, stochastic mean payoff games, and in particular mean payoff…