Related papers: Stackelberg Pricing is Hard to Approximate within …
We revisit the deadline version of the discrete time-cost tradeoff problem for the special case of bounded depth. Such instances occur for example in VLSI design. The depth of an instance is the number of jobs in a longest chain and is…
Designing socially optimal policies in multi-agent environments is a fundamental challenge in both economics and artificial intelligence. This paper studies a general framework for learning Stackelberg equilibria in dynamic and uncertain…
Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept in two-player games where the leader has commitment rights over the follower. In recent years, it has become a cornerstone of many security applications, including airport patrolling and…
The quadratic shortest path problem is the problem of finding a path in a directed graph such that the sum of interaction costs over all pairs of arcs on the path is minimized. We derive several semidefinite programming relaxations for the…
We examine the possibility of approximating Maximum Vertex-Disjoint Shortest Paths. In this problem, the input is an edge-weighted (directed or undirected) $n$-vertex graph $G$ along with $k$ terminal pairs…
Bundle pricing refers to designing several product combinations (i.e., bundles) and determining their prices in order to maximize the expected profit. It is a classic problem in revenue management and arises in many industries, such as…
We consider the problem of choosing prices of a set of products so as to maximize profit, taking into account self-elasticity and cross-elasticity, subject to constraints on the prices. We show that this problem can be formulated as…
In this paper, we investigate distributionally robust model order reduction for linear, discrete-time, time-invariant systems. The external input is assumed to follow an uncertain distribution within a Wasserstein ambiguity set. We begin by…
In this paper, we are concerned with the stabilizatbility of Stackelberg game-based systems. In particular, two players are involved in the system where one is the follower to minimize the related cost function and the other is the leader…
We formulate a Stackelberg game between an attacker and a defender of a power system. The attacker attempts to alter the load setpoints of the power system covertly and intelligently, so that the voltage stability margin of the grid is…
A well-studied continuous model of graphs considers each edge as a continuous unit-length interval of points. In the problem $\delta$-Tour defined within this model, the objective to find a shortest tour that comes within a distance of…
We study bottleneck routing games where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. Bottleneck games have been studied in the literature by having the player's utility costs to be determined by the…
We study the problems of pricing an indivisible product to consumers who are embedded in a given social network. The goal is to maximize the revenue of the seller. We assume impatient consumers who buy the product as soon as the seller…
Given an $n$-vertex non-negatively real-weighted graph $G$, whose vertices are partitioned into a set of $k$ clusters, a \emph{clustered network design problem} on $G$ consists of solving a given network design optimization problem on $G$,…
Effective game-theoretic modeling of defender-attacker behavior is becoming increasingly important. In many domains, the defender functions not only as a player but also the designer of the game's payoff structure. We study Stackelberg…
Consider the following generalization of the classic binary search problem: A searcher is required to find a hidden target vertex $x$ in a graph $G$. To do so, they iteratively perform queries to an oracle, each about a chosen vertex $v$.…
We consider a stochastic game between a trader and a central bank in a target zone market with a lower currency peg. This currency peg is maintained by the central bank through the generation of permanent price impact, thereby aggregating…
Principal-agent problems arise when one party acts on behalf of another, leading to conflicts of interest. The economic literature has extensively studied principal-agent problems, and recent work has extended this to more complex scenarios…
Priced timed games are optimal-cost reachability games played between two players---the controller and the environment---by moving a token along the edges of infinite graphs of configurations of priced timed automata. The goal of the…
The study of repeated interactions between a learner and a utility-maximizing optimizer has yielded deep insights into the manipulability of learning algorithms. However, existing literature primarily focuses on independent, unlinked…