Related papers: Evolutionary game dynamics in a growing structured…

Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. The structure of a biological population affects which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations is difficult. Precise results have been…

Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals. The behaviour of such systems can be often described within game-theoretic models. In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental concepts…

A network model based on players' aspirations is proposed and analyzed theoretically and numerically within the framework of evolutionary game theory. In this model, players decide whether to cooperate or defect by comparing their payoffs…

In this paper, we show that different types of evolutionary game dynamics are, in principle, special cases of a dynamical system model based on our previously reported framework of generalized growth transforms. The framework shows that…

Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection. Favoring players with higher fitness, the latter is key for understanding the challenges faced by…

It is well-known that population structure is a catalyst for the evolution of cooperation since individuals can reciprocate with their neighbors through local interactions defined by network structures. Previous research typically relies on…

In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation…

This paper investigates the long-term behavior of an interacting particle system of interest in the hot topic of evolutionary game theory. Each site of the $d$-dimensional integer lattice is occupied by a player who is characterized by one…

Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations are strongly affected by updating rules. Previous studies usually focus on imitation-based rules, which rely on payoff information of social peers. Recent behavioral experiments suggest…

We study evolutionary games in a spatial diluted grid environment in which agents strategically interact locally but can also opportunistically move to other positions within a given migration radius. Using the imitation of the best rule…

We study the evolutionary dynamics of games under environmental feedback using replicator equations for two interacting populations. One key feature is to consider jointly the co-evolution of the dynamic payoff matrices and the state of the…

Wealthy individuals may be less tempted to defect than those with comparatively low payoffs. To take this into consideration, we introduce coevolutionary success-driven multigames in structured populations. While the core game is always the…

We consider a dynamic social network model in which agents play repeated games in pairings determined by a stochastically evolving social network. Individual agents begin to interact at random, with the interactions modeled as games. The…

Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…

In this article we discuss network growth based on Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) where palyers on nodes in a network palay with its linked players. The players estimate total profits in the PD. When a new node is attached, the node make linkes to…

The commonly used accumulated payoff scheme is not invariant with respect to shifts of payoff values when applied locally in degree-inhomogeneous population structures. We propose a suitably modified payoff scheme and we show both formally…

Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and the public goods game is studied, where initially players belong to two independent structured populations. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players whose current utility…

We introduce a new model of competition on growing networks. This extends the preferential attachment model, with the key property that node choices evolve simultaneously with the network. When a new node joins the network, it chooses…

We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…

Existing theoretical models of evolution focus on the relative fitness advantages of different mutants in a population while the dynamic behavior of the population size is mostly left unconsidered. We here present a generic stochastic model…