Related papers: Truthful Mechanisms via Greedy Iterative Packing
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a…
We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the…
A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty…
We study Matching and other related problems in a partial information setting where the agents' utilities for being matched to other agents are hidden and the mechanism only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is…
We study a fair division problem with indivisible items, namely the computation of maximin share allocations. Given a set of $n$ players, the maximin share of a single player is the best she can guarantee to herself, if she would partition…
Enhancing resilience in multi-agent systems in the face of selfish agents is an important problem that requires further characterisation. This work develops a truthful mechanism that avoids self-interested and strategic agents maliciously…
We consider interactive learning and covering problems, in a setting where actions may incur different costs, depending on the response to the action. We propose a natural greedy algorithm for response-dependent costs. We bound the…
We consider the problem of approximating a given element $f$ from a Hilbert space $\mathcal{H}$ by means of greedy algorithms and the application of such procedures to the regression problem in statistical learning theory. We improve on the…
A novel and detailed convergence analysis is presented for a greedy algorithm that was previously introduced for operator reconstruction problems in the field of quantum mechanics. This algorithm is based on an offline/online decomposition…
We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving reduction from truthfully maximizing \emph{any} objective under…
Auctions in which agents' payoffs are random variables have received increased attention in recent years. In particular, recent work in algorithmic mechanism design has produced mechanisms employing internal randomization, partly in…
Considering the set cover problem, by modifying the approach that gives a logarithmic approximation guarantee for the greedy algorithm, we obtain an estimation of the greedy algorithm's accuracy for a particular input. We compare the…
Fair resource allocation is a fundamental optimization problem with applications in operations research, networking, and economic and game theory. Research in these areas has led to the general acceptance of a class of $\alpha$-fair utility…
We perform an experimental study of algorithms for online bipartite matching under the known i.i.d. input model with integral types. In the last decade, there has been substantial effort in designing complex algorithms with the goal of…
The frame algorithm uses a simple recursive formula to approximate an unknown vector from its frame coefficients. This note introduces an adaptive version of the frame algorithm that maximizes the error reduction between steps in terms of…
Greedy algorithms are widely used for problems in machine learning such as feature selection and set function optimization. Unfortunately, for large datasets, the running time of even greedy algorithms can be quite high. This is because for…
We present and discuss general techniques for proving inapproximability results for truthful mechanisms. We make use of these techniques to prove lower bounds on the approximability of several non-utilitarian multi-parameter problems. In…
A rapidly growing literature on lying in behavioral economics and psychology shows that individuals often do not lie even when lying maximizes their utility. In this work, we attempt to incorporate these findings into the theory of…
We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains both positive and negative values. We show that the class of…
We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on…