Related papers: Where are the really hard manipulation problems? T…
We investigate an iterative deliberation process for an agent community wishing to make a joint decision. We develop a general model consisting of a community of n agents, each with their initial ideal point in some metric space (X, d),…
This paper proposes normative criteria for voting rules under uncertainty about individual preferences. The criteria emphasize the importance of responsiveness, i.e., the probability that the social outcome coincides with the realized…
In the context of computational social choice, we study voting methods that assign a set of winners to each profile of voter preferences. A voting method satisfies the property of positive involvement (PI) if for any election in which a…
We consider the problem of protecting and manipulating elections by recounting and changing ballots, respectively. Our setting involves a plurality-based election held across multiple districts, and the problem formulations are based on the…
We investigate the problem of computing the probability of winning in an election where voter attendance is uncertain. More precisely, we study the setting where, in addition to a total ordering of the candidates, each voter is associated…
We investigate the complexity of {\sc{Constructive Control by Adding/Deleting Votes}} (CCAV/CCDV) for $r$-approval, Condorcet, Maximin and Copeland$^{\alpha}$ in $k$-axes and $k$-candidates partition single-peaked elections. In general, we…
Understanding when and how computational complexity can be used to protect elections against different manipulative actions has been a highly active research area over the past two decades. A recent body of work, however, has shown that…
It is important to understand how the outcome of an election can be modified by an agent with control over the structure of the election. Electoral control has been studied for many election systems, but for all studied systems the winner…
The group identification problem asks to identify a socially qualified subgroup among a group of individuals based on their pairwise valuations. There are several different rules that can be used to determine the social qualification…
The voting process is formalized as a multistage voting model with successive alternative elimination. A finite number of agents vote for one of the alternatives each round subject to their preferences. If the number of votes given to the…
Viscous democracy is a generalization of liquid democracy, a social choice framework in which voters may transitively delegate their votes. In viscous democracy, a "viscosity" factor decreases the weight of a delegation the further it…
The role of an expert in the decision-making process is crucial, as the final recommendation depends on his disposition, clarity of mind, experience, and knowledge of the problem. However, the recommendation also depends on their honesty.…
This paper examines an area of Game Theory called Voting Power Theory. With the adoption of a measure theoretic framework it argues that the many different indices and tools currently used for measuring voting power can be replaced by just…
Gerrymandering is a practice of manipulating district boundaries and locations in order to achieve a political advantage for a particular party. Lewenberg, Lev, and Rosenschein [AAMAS 2017] initiated the algorithmic study of a…
Bribery in an election is one of the well-studied control problems in computational social choice. In this paper, we propose and study the safe bribery problem. Here the goal of the briber is to ask the bribed voters to vote in such a way…
Electoral control refers to attempts by an election's organizer ("the chair") to influence the outcome by adding/deleting/partitioning voters or candidates. The groundbreaking work of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] on (constructive)…
In this paper we examine a variant of the voter model on a dynamically changing network where agents have the option of changing their friends rather than changing their opinions. We analyse, in the context of dense random graphs, two…
Scoring systems are an extremely important class of election systems. We study the complexity of manipulation, constructive control by deleting voters (CCDV), and bribery for scoring systems. For manipulation, we show that for all scoring…
Majority voting is one of the few black-box interventions that can improve a fixed stochastic predictor: repeated access can be cheaper than changing a high-capability model. Classical fixed-competence theory makes this intervention look…
News outlets, surveyors, and other organizations often conduct polls on social networks to gain insights into public opinion. Such a poll is typically started by someone on a social network who sends it to her friends. If a person…